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ABSTRACT 
 
 Controlling the massive problem of excess nutrient pollution in America’s most 
prominent waters through the Clean Water Act continues to challenge administrators both on the 
ground and in the courts. Widespread hypoxia in the Gulf of Mexico, impaired waterways in 
Florida, and a declining fishing industry in the Chesapeake Bay illustrate continuing failures to 
remedy existing degradation and prevent future harm.  The Act’s structure of cooperative 
federalism places primacy with the states to handle the runoff, yet inaction by the states and the 
absence of a clear solution has prompted lawsuits by environmental groups seeking stringent 
intervention and lobbying groups vowing to protect their agricultural industry from increased 
regulation. Traditional courses of action within the cooperative federalism framework need to 
expand and accommodate the massive problem instead of remaining legally and scientifically 
static. Nudging, made popular in recent literature, could be the key policy tool to drive this 
expansion because it induces improvement through systems that preserve a person’s liberty, 
alleviating constitutional concerns over land use. The water quality standard setting process 
provides new mediums in which to nudge, but when programs and policies intended to nudge 
turn into a shove, the judiciary plays an important role in preserving the balance. Contrasting 
approaches in each watershed provide insight to crafting policies that shift towards balanced and 
effective nutrient pollution controls before additional legislation is imposed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  iii  
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
 
This paper is dedicated to my mentor, Professor Jody Endres, and I would like to thank 
my advising committee for their guidance throughout the writing process. Thank you also to my 
colleague Ian Cecala for his research assistance. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  iv  
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
 
INTRODUCTION ...........................................................................................................................1 
 
PART I: NUDGING UNDER COOPERATIVE FEDERALISM...................................................7 
 
PART II: NUDGING IN THE CLEAN WATER ACT ................................................................14 
 
PART III: WHEN DOES A NUDGE BECOME A SHOVE: NUTRIENT LITIGATION ..........23 
 
PART IV: INCENTIVIZING STATE MANAGEMENT PLANS ...............................................44 
 
CONCLUSION ..............................................................................................................................55 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  1  
INTRODUCTION 
 
After lunch, you dispose of your cafeteria waste by separating out the 
aluminum, paper, and plastic products according to the lids on the garbage can. 
You might not realize it at the time or even consciously decide, but the lids have 
increased recycling rates by 34% compared to containers without these lids.1 
Described in popular literature as “nudging,” the phenomenon draws on the 
architecture of choices to maintain freedom of decision-making, while influencing 
behavior in order to improve the lives of citizens.2 In the context of environmental 
pollution, this policy tool can be particularly effective by alleviating constitutional 
concerns over areas of land use regulation traditionally reserved to states and 
private owners, while preserving the core goals implicit in environmental 
protection.3   
Since 1972, the United States has been striving to “restore and maintain 
the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the Nation's waters” through a 
system of federal and state checks and balances under the Clean Water Act.4 The 
structure, known as cooperative federalism, gives primary authority to the states 
to handle most forms of pollution within their own boundaries, while reserving 
                                                 
1 Noah Castelo, Policy Memorandum: The Behavioral Dimension of Climate Change Policy, 2 
JOURNAL OF SCIENCE POLICY AND GOVERNANCE 1 (2012) available at 
http://www.sciencepolicyjournal.org/volume-2-issue-1.html; Although nudging as used here is a 
rather small decision, nudging has also established a record of adoption and success on some 
large, complex policy challenges, such as smoking restrictions in public places like bars and 
restaurants or anti-smoking advertising. See Alberto Alemanno, Nudging Smokers: The 
Behavioural Turn of Tobacco Risk Regulation, 3 EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF RISK REGULATION 1 
(2013).. 
2 A “nudge” is “any aspect of the choice architecture that alters people’s behavior in a predictable 
way without forbidding any options or significantly changing their economic incentives.” 
Although often used in a social and economic context, the theory has applications in many 
different fields. RICHARD H. THALER AND CASS R. SUNSTEIN NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS 
ABOUT HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS 5 (2008) [hereinafter NUDGE]. 
3 See Rachel Croson, Nicolas Treich, Behavioral Environmental Economics: Promises and 
Challenges, 58 ENVIRONMENTAL AND RESOURCE ECONOMICS 335 (2014). 
4 Federal Water Pollution Control Act of 1972 (Clean Water Act), Pub. L. No. 92-500, 86 Stat. 
816904 (codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (2012)). 
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power for the federal government to impose their own restrictions if a state fails to 
meet the purposes of the Act. The innate tension created by the often not-so-
cooperative federalism design has been the subject of debate for much of the 
Act’s history.5   
 Widespread nonpoint source pollution, the most significant origin of 
water pollution in the United States, also happens to be the least regulated.6 
Unlike its counterpart point sources, recognized as those outfalls with “any 
discernible, confined and discrete conveyance,” no stringent permit system exists 
within the Clean Water Act to the ubiquitous and the diffuse runoff known as 
nonpoint source discharge.7 A lack of a statutory definition of nonpoint sources 
within the Clean Water Act further complicates the water pollution issues. 
Essentially those sources not meeting the qualifications of point sources fall into 
the nonpoint source classification, such as urban runoff, fertilizer overflow from 
agricultural fields, or sediment from construction sites.8 Rather than implement 
                                                 
5 Robert L. Glicksman, From Cooperative to Inoperative Federalism: The Perverse Mutation of 
Environmental Law and Policy, 41 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 719 (2006) 
6 David Zaring, Agriculture, Nonpoint Source Pollution, and Regulatory Control: The Clean 
Water Act's Bleak Present and Future, 20 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 515 (1996); see also EPA, 
EPA841-F-96-004A, NONPOINT SOURCE POLLUTION: THE NATION'S LARGEST WATER QUALITY 
PROBLEM 
POINTER NO. 1, available at http://water.epa.gov/polwaste/nps/outreach/point1.cfm 
7 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14) (2000) (“This term does not include agricultural stormwater discharges and 
return flows from irrigated agriculture”); 40 C.F.R. § 122.3(e)-(f) (“The following discharges do 
not require NPDES permits…Any introduction of pollutants from nonpoint source agricultural and 
silvicultural activities, including storm water runoff from orchards, cultivated crops, pastures, 
range lands, and forest lands, but not discharges from concentrated animal feeding 
operations…discharges from concentrated aquatic animal production facilities…discharges to 
aquaculture projects…discharges from silvicultural point sources…Return flows from irrigated 
agriculture).  
8 “NPS pollution includes pollution caused by rainfall or snowmelt moving over and through the 
ground and carrying natural and human-made pollutants into lakes, rivers, streams, wetlands, 
estuaries, other coastal waters and ground water.” EPA, EPA NONPOINT SOURCE PROGRAM AND 
GRANTS GUIDELINES FOR STATES AND TERRITORIES, at 7 (2013) available at 
http://www.epa.gov/polluted-runoff-nonpoint-source-pollution/319-grant-current-guidance; see 
also EPA, EPA-SAB-08-003, HYPOXIA IN THE NORTHERN GULF OF MEXICO: AN UPDATE BY THE 
EPA SCIENCE ADVISORY BOARD at 10 (2007), available at 
http://water.epa.gov/type/watersheds/named/msbasin/tfproducts.cfm#sab (“Often, it is human 
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permitting limitations on nonpoint source runoff, the Act relies on proposed load 
allocations, state nutrient management plans, and section 319 grant funding for 
local voluntary management practices to restore and maintain chemical, physical, 
and biological integrity of the Nation's waters.9  
Optimism for success of voluntary measures is in short supply.10 Given the 
inherent difficulties in managing nonpoint sources, simply providing federal 
financial and technical support has failed to remedy the eutrophic and hypoxic 
conditions necessary to support ecologically and economically sustainable use.11 
The disparate regulation of sources causes the greatest improvements to be seen in 
many rivers and lakes located in urban and industrialized areas, which have 
traditionally suffered primarily from point source discharges.12 Current National 
Water Quality Inventory reports largely implicate nonpoint sources, particularly 
from the agricultural sector, as the greatest contributor of pollution to our nations 
waters.13 Of the rivers and streams assessed, 54% were found to be unable to 
                                                                                                                                     
activities that contribute significantly to excess nutrient concentrations in water bodies, other 
examples include golf courses, and lawns; improper application of animal manure”) 
9 33 U.S.C. § 1329 (2015). 
10 See Daniel R. Mandelker, Controlling Nonpoint Source Water Pollution: Can It Be Done?, 65 
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 479 (1989) (“The Clean Water Act has always required nonpoint source 
controls in state and regional water quality planning programs, but these controls have not 
remedied the nonpoint pollution problem”); Zaring, supra, note 6, at 528 (“Further, a simple 
economic analysis shows that farmers have little incentive to participate in voluntary pollution 
reduction programs. Farmers do not bear the total costs of off-farm pollution and erosion”). 
11 Mandelker, supra, note 10, at 479 (“Nonpoint pollution comes from a variety of sources that 
require different types of controls. Nonpoint sources resist controls because they are expensive, 
and the expense is not easily passed on to consumers. Nonpoint source controls are difficult to 
coordinate because they are usually administered by local rather than state governments. Local 
governments do not have an incentive to adopt nonpoint source controls because their nonpoint 
pollution usually is exported elsewhere”).  
12 See William L. Andreen, Water Quality Today-Has the Clean Water Act Been A Success? 55 
ALA. L. REV. 537, at 591 (2004). 
13 EPA Office of Water, EPA 841-R-08-001, NATIONAL WATER QUALITY INVENTORY: REPORT TO 
CONGRESS 2004 REPORTING CYCLE (2009); EPA, Assessment and Total Maximum Daily Load 
Tracking and Implementation System (ATTAINS), http://www3.epa.gov/waters/ir/ (last visited 
April 4, 2016); see also USDA and NRCS, ASSESSMENT OF THE EFFECTS OF CONSERVATION 
PRACTICES ON CULTIVATED CROPLAND IN THE UPPER MISSISSIPPI RIVER BASIN (2012) available 
at 
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support their designated uses, such as fishing and swimming.14 Lake and reservoir 
assessments reported a staggering 69% impairment level, and bays and estuaries 
revealed 78% impairment.15  
With little political urgency to challenge the status quo written rules 
applicable to the highly organized agricultural industry, neither Congress nor the 
states are likely to legislate mandatory nonpoint source pollution controls. 16 
Nonetheless, environmental system regulation does not always require new laws 
and standards from the top to be effective in practice; and it also almost certainly 
does not guarantee success.17 Faced with a challenge that at every step grows 
more complex, other policy forms provide crucial avenues for gradually abating 
massive problems.18 People generally need the nudge the most for “decisions that 
are difficult, complex, and infrequent, and when they have poor feedback and few 
opportunities for learning,”19 and massive environmental problems like nutrient 
pollution are no different.20 
Massive problems possess certain characteristics that defeat the 
conventional roles established under cooperative federalism and the Clean Water 
                                                                                                                                     
http://www.nrcs.usda.gov/wps/portal/nrcs/detail/national/technical/nra/ceap/?cid=nrcs143_0141
61 
14 Id. 
15 Id.  
16 Zaring, supra, note 6, at 515 “The agricultural interests, rooted in a discrete group that has both 
strong incentives to organize in order to avoid regulation and a relatively small, easily organized 
structure, have a particularly large influence on pollution control legislation passed by Congress.”  
17 As explained in Massachusetts v. E.P.A., “[a]gencies, like legislatures, do not generally resolve 
massive problems in one fell regulatory swoop.” Massachusetts v. E.P.A., 549 U.S. 497, 524, 
(2007). 
18 Massive problems are characterized by the complex accumulation of economic, environmental, 
and social impacts from multiple sources.  
J.B. Ruhl & James Salzman, Climate Change, Dead Zones, and Massive Problems in the 
Administrative State: A Guide for Whittling Away, 98 CAL. L. REV. 59, 65 (2010) [hereinafter 
MASSIVE PROBLEMS]. 
19 NUDGE, supra note 2, at 74, 250. 
20 For example, the use of energy efficient labeling to combat energy consumption. See Richard G. 
Newell, and Juha V. Siikamäki. Nudging energy efficiency behavior: The role of information 
labels, No. w19224, National Bureau of Economic Research (2013). 
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Act, such as aggregation from multiple sources, feedback loops back into the 
system, adaptive management issues, and no clear solution.21 Thus, the traditional 
cooperative federalism framework needs to adapt properly to the massive 
problem, instead of remaining both scientifically and legally stagnant. 22  I 
advocate that nudging is the ideal policy catalyst to push environmental 
federalism and appropriately address nonpoint source nutrient pollution as it seeks 
to do so by minimizing effects on a person’s freedom of choice. Nudging occurs 
through six principles of choice architecture, all of which have application to the 
Clean Water Act: sensible incentives23, well-defined mapping24, use of defaults25, 
feedback26, expecting error27, and structuring complex choices.28 
In part I this paper explores the cooperative federalism framework and 
how generally the framework nudges roles within the state and federal 
relationship. Part II identifies novel uses of nudging in the Clean Water Act water 
quality standard development process. Part III evaluates the role of the courts in 
arbitrating the balance of interests within a nudge and whether it exceeds. Finally 
Part IV examines the nudging implicit in voluntary nutrient programs, and when it 
                                                 
21 MASSIVE PROBLEMS, supra note 18, at 65 (Massive problems generally feature and aggregate of 
multiple causal sources (number, diversity, distribution, size/effect), consist of causal attributes 
(Scale, timing, relationship), and result in cumulative effects (spatial distributions, metrics, 
temporal distribution), and have no clear discrete solution). 
22 Douglas R. Williams, When Voluntary, Incentive-Based Controls Fail: Structuring A 
Regulatory Response to Agricultural Nonpoint Source Water Pollution, 9 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 
21 (2002) (“This limited offering of incentives is, quite simply, not enough; if the United States is 
to make significant further progress toward attaining water quality objectives, efforts to control 
nonpoint source pollution must be expanded”) 
23 NUDGE, supra note 2, at 98.  Incentives are a classic form of nudge, such as a coupon.  
24 Id. at 93. Mapping helps people navigate the choice structure, such as the sticker at the ATM 
which indicates the proper way to insert your card.  
25 Id. at 85. People tend to stick with the default option they are given, for example sticking with 
the default settings on a phone.  
26 Id. at 92. Providing feedback nudges by indicates proper use, such as a computer icon lighting 
up when it is running low on battery.  
27 Id. at 89. Expecting error can nudge because it corrects improper action, for example a car may 
beep when seatbelts are not engaged.  
28 Id. at 96. Structuring complex choices limits or sets the range of available options, for example a 
restaurant menu. 
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does not go far enough. Granted, the solutions identified herein may not always 
be so unobtrusive as the trashcan example, however this seeks to alleviate a 
national epidemic that plagues the nation’s most pristine waters. Nudging occurs 
on a spectrum, all nudges, even small ones, have some degree of coercion.  
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PART I: NUDGING UNDER COOPERATIVE FEDERALISM  
 
From the very earliest stages of the Clean Water Act legislation, the 
allocation of power within the cooperative federalism structure has been the 
subject of debate.29 As the ultimate choice architect, Congress elected a method 
that ideally would remedy the concerns encountered with allocation of authority 
solely to either the federal government or the states.30 Unlike its counterpart “dual 
federalism,” distinguished when power is divided between the federal and state 
governments in clearly defined terms, the cooperative federalism structure hinges 
on a collaborative approach between state and federal agencies to reach water 
quality goals. 31  For example, the Clean Water Act savings clause explicitly 
provides for federal oversight to “recognize, preserve, and protect the primary 
responsibilities and rights of States ...to plan the development and use...of land 
and water resources....”32 The attempt to nudge cooperation between federal and 
state agencies troubled the dynamic from the outset because success is strongly 
correlated to instances when interests are aligned.33  This is seldom the case, 
because there is no such concept as a neutral design; even the seemingly arbitrary 
decisions have subtle impacts on entities under the Act.34 Take for instance the 
definition of “Navigable Waters” in section 502(7) of the Clean Water Act and its 
jurisdictional implications for the cooperative federalism.35 What at the time was 
                                                 
29 Andreen, supra note 12, at 274.  
30 NUDGE, supra note 2, at 3 (discussing the responsibility of choice architect for organizing the 
context in which people make decisions) 
31 See Robert L. Fischman, Cooperative Federalism and Natural Resources Law, 14 N.Y.U. Envtl. 
L.J. 179, 184 (2005) (“Dual federalism is a term that should be reserved for situations where either 
the federal and state governments act independently, without attempting to align their efforts, or 
where the federal and state spheres of authority do not overlap”). 
32 33 U.S.C. § 1251(b) (1972). 
33 NUDGE, supra note 2, at 186. 
34 Id. at 3.  
35 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7) (2014) 
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likely a seemingly trivial decision to define it as the “waters of the United States” 
has evolved into a massive regulatory dispute over jurisdictional boundaries. 36  
 
a. Cooperative Federalism in Theory 
 
The cooperative federalism configuration, for all its flaws, was chosen for 
a multitude of reasons.37 As Oliver Houck notes regarding early years of water 
pollution abatement backed only by federal financial support, “programs run by 
the states with federal assistance had failed utterly for 25 years.”38 Prior to the 
1972 revisions, few states had bothered to set or enforce water quality goals, 
hence the need for some recognition of federal oversight.39 States were not willing 
to implement real standards with bite, inevitably leading to a “race-to-the-bottom” 
regulatory approach, perhaps the most common justification for federal 
involvement. 40  This dilemma creates further incentives to under regulate by 
                                                 
36 Four Supreme Court Cases in the last two decades have discussed the extent of navigable water 
jurisdiction, See Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook Cty. v. Army Corps of Engineers, 531 
U.S. 159 (2001) (SWANCC) (no jurisdiction over completely isolated waters); United States v. 
Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121 (1985) (conferring jurisdiction over waters beyond 
the traditional definition of navigability); Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715 (2006) (defining 
it as water with a “continuous surface connection”); United States v. Appalachian Elec. Power 
Co., 311 U.S. 377 at 409 (1940) (waters made navigable with “reasonable improvements). As of 
writing, the proposed rule defining the waters of the United States, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers 
and U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, “the Clean Water Rule.” 80 Fed.Reg. 37,054 (June 
29, 2015), was being litigated. See In re U.S. Dep't of Def., U.S. E.P.A. Final Rule: Clean Water 
Rule: Definition of Waters of U.S., No. 15- 3839, 2016 WL 723241 (6th Cir. Feb. 22, 2016). 
37 See Michael S. Greve, Against Cooperative Federalism, 70 MISS. L.J. 557 (2000). 
38  Oliver A. Houck, Cooperative Federalism, Nutrients, and the Clean Water Act: Three Cases 
Revisited, 44 ENVTL. L. REP. 10426 (2014). 
39 Id.  
40 Richard L. Revesz, Rehabilitating Interstate Competition: Rethinking the "Race-to-the-Bottom" 
Rationale for Federal Environmental Regulation, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1210 (1992) (“Perhaps the 
most widely accepted justification for environmental regulation at the federal level is that it 
prevents states from competing for industry by offering pollution control standards that are lower 
than other states competing for the siting of industrial and manufacturing opportunities”).  
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placing industrial externalities on other states with more stringent standards.41 As 
it turns out, states, like people, tend to make poor choices in contexts where they 
are inexperienced, poorly informed, and feedback is slow to materialize.42  
Additionally, permitting states to independently design and implement 
water quality programs in piecemeal fashion is neither cost efficient nor entirely 
accurate.43 Rational decision-making contemplates the available data and uses it 
as a reference to inform choice. 44  Although a sound methodology, the final 
outcome is anchored to that particular foundational data set.45 As a result, states 
would likely promulgate vastly different water quality standards derived from 
their individual baseline. Cooperative federalism counteracts this phenomenon for 
point sources by first setting a regulatory floor and permitting a significant degree 
of flexibility in implementation.46 Federal involvement thus induces development 
of state water quality standards by influencing the applicable range.47 In the point 
source world, application of this principle through the NPDES permit system is 
clear, but for those diffuse sources it occurs more discretely.  
                                                 
41 Id. at 1222 (“The presence of interstate externalities is a powerful reason for intervention at the 
federal level: because some of the benefits of a state's pollution control policies accrue to 
downwind states, states have an incentive to underregulate. But this incentive would exist even in 
the absence of a race to the bottom”).  
42 NUDGE, supra note 2, at 9. 
43 Glicksman, supra note 6, at 733-734 (“Similarly, federal environmental legislation arguably 
permits environmental policymakers to take advantage of the economies of scale that result from 
the adoption of national standards…. The federal government was thus better equipped to develop 
the necessary expertise to formulate effective environmental regulatory standards as well as to 
implement and enforce those standards in an efficient manner.”  
44 NUDGE, supra note 2, at 23 (“You start with some anchor, the number you know, and adjust in 
the direction you think is appropriate”). 
45 Id. Anchoring refers to the use of setting standards based on the reference points or anchors 
from another place or system. “Generally, this incorporates bias, and the adjustment is insufficient. 
However we can nudge the adjustment figure by suggesting a starting point”.  
46 The Clean Water Act’s “regulatory floor” is found in 33 U.S.C. § 1370 (2014), which states in 
part that any “State or political subdivision or interstate agency may not adopt or enforce any 
effluent limitation…or standard of performance which is less stringent than the effluent 
limitation… or standard of performance” set by EPA. 
47 NUDGE, supra note 2, at 24. Take for example campaign fundraising. When candidates request a 
specific range of prices such as $100, $150, or $200, you are more likely to donate on par with 
those figures than $5 because the candidate has created a baseline.  
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Traditionally, the solution is increased federal regulatory control 
mandating uniform socially and economically optimal standards.48 In theory, the 
federal government, while also concerned about economic development, is more 
willing to implement necessary legislative sanctions despite potential financial 
burdens.49 Referencing the federal standards, congressional leaders in the Public 
Works Committee responsible for drafting the Act, wrote “[t]he committee 
believes that if the timetables established throughout the Act are to be met, the 
threat of sanction must be real, and enforcement provisions must be swift and 
direct.” 50   This certainly tends to be the case with point sources, but is not 
reflected in control of nonpoint sources. 
 
b. Theory Informing Practice: Cooperative Federalism and Nonpoint 
sources  
 
Given the diffuse nature of nonpoint source water pollution, the typical 
“command and control” approach is difficult to implement. 51  The lack of 
flexibility, barriers to meaningful public participation, and stifling of state and 
local innovation characteristic to command and control legislation would 
significantly inhibit management of nonpoint sources primarily because of the 
strong correlation between land use and runoff pollution. 52  The principles 
                                                 
48 See Henry N. Butler & Jonathan R. Macey, Externalities and the Matching Principle: The Case 
for Reallocating Environmental Regulatory Authority, 14 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 23, 42 (1996); 
Revesz, supra note 40, at 1217; John P. Dwyer, The Practice of Federalism Under the Clean Air 
Act, 54 MD. L. REV. 1183, 1219 (1995) (“The usual justifications for a dominant federal role in 
environmental regulation are to take advantage of economies of scale with regard to research and 
data collection, to regulate interstate pollution, and to replace unduly weak state regulation”). 
49 See William W. Buzbee, Contextual Environmental Federalism, 14 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 108, 
121 (2005) (discussing the different interests by state and federal government to impose regulatory 
burdens or economic sanctions).  
50 Andreen, supra note 12, at 271. 
 
51 See Williams, supra note 22, at 26-27 (discussing how number of farms, different practices, and 
locations make a technology-based approach with uniform effluent limitations difficult). 
52 Id.  
  11  
underlying the nudge concept are well aligned with policies available in the 
nonpoint sources realm, and likely needs to be triggered in order to escape the 
heavy hand of paternalistic legislation without the preservation of libertarianism 
choice. Cooperative federalism to some extent reconciles these concerns, 
preserving state autonomy by heavily relying on federal financial and technical 
assistance for those sources, but needs to occur at much more meaningful level.53  
First, preserving state management over hydrological nutrient loads 
accommodates the natural properties of water pollution and the natural chemical 
variation of water bodies.54 The pollutants associated with nonpoint sources are 
often organic, which poses challenges for the regulating community.55 Placing 
sole responsibility for managing the diverse aquatic systems across the nation 
would incur vast amounts of federal EPA timing and resources (the reason why 
President Nixon initially vetoed the bill).56 The Clean Water Act was meant to 
encourage states to implement controls aligned more appropriately with the 
natural systems, with federal agency feedback. Feedback is an essential aspect of 
the system because it tells people when they are performing well and when they 
are making mistakes.57 However, feedback is only effective if the person heeds 
the advice.58   
Second, structuring choices with anchors can also work at a regional scale, 
by which reference points are taken at a holistic watershed level and then used to 
distribute load accountability to states, sectors or other political entities.59 The 
                                                 
53 See 33 U.S.C.A. § 1329(f) and (h) Technical assistance for States and Grant program 
54 This natural variability of nutrient levels due to differences in geology, climate and waterbody 
type indicate that a single pollutant concentration number to support a designated use for 
nationwide application is not appropriate for nutrients. EPA, EPA 822-R-98-002, NATIONAL 
STRATEGY FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF REGIONAL NUTRIENT CRITERIA (1998). 
55 Id.  
56 Andreen, supra note 12, at 285. 
57 NUDGE, supra note 2, at 92. 
58 Id.  
59 See infra notes 44-45 and accompanying text (explaining anchoring); and infra 30 and 
accompanying text (discussing structuring complex choices). 
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methodology takes advantage of economies of scales by permitting states to tailor 
implementation to meet their specific responsibilities based on federal 
benchmarks and recommendations at an appropriate environmental scale.60 Thus 
voluntary programs such as Gulf Hypoxia Task Force and judicial interpretations 
such the Chesapeake Bay litigation are a powerful means to accurately apportion 
true pollutant load accountability to the states.61 When states are given their true 
pollution liability, they are less prone to underestimate their accountability with 
frivolous standards and much more likely to implement standards with 
appropriate values which align the interests of the states in the watershed. With 
additional federal oversight of a regional collaboration, states view the pollution 
targets as considerably more achievable because they have a support structure.62  
Third, framing of the nutrient pollution problem is a powerful nudge in the 
regulation context for structuring choices. 63  People in general tend to be 
extremely loss adverse, generally the cost of losing something is much greater 
than the benefit of gaining that same object.64 Since the consequences associated 
with nonpoint source pollution are framed as potential losses instead of possible 
gains, states are induced to initiate remedial measures for fear of losing authority 
under the threat of federal intervention. As it stands, states have the benefit of 
seeing the effects of command and control regulation as well as the cooperative 
approach. Over the past few years, the looming threat of legislation, citizen 
lawsuits and federal regulations spurred a rise in nutrient pollution programs.  
The states and federal government wield a significant amount of power to 
nudge one another in the nonpoint realm because both possess the power to 
                                                 
60 Robert V. Percival, Environmental Federalism: Historical Roots and Contemporary Models, 54 
MD. L. REV. 1141, 1174 (1995) (discussing cooperative federalism model and it economies of 
scale).   
61 See infra notes 132-168. 
62 NUDGE, supra note 2, at 41; Williams, supra note 22, at 27. 
63 Id. at 36. 
64 Id.   
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legislate.65 Thus often the object of the nudge is not always clear, but neither is 
the cause of the problem. Multiple forms of nudging occur because there are so 
many different stakeholders that play into the creation of the massive problem.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
65 Even public interest groups exercise influence through citizen suit authority. See 33 U.S.C § 
1365 (2014).  
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PART II: NUDGING IN THE CLEAN WATER ACT 
 
 Nudging occurs in many ways as noted above simply as a function of the 
cooperative federalism framework, but there are many tangible applications for 
the principles of choice architecture within the statutory provisions of the Clean 
Water Act and the process setting water quality standards.  
 
a. Feedback through the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination 
System  
 
From the outset, the drafters of the Act recognized that because “[w]ater 
moves in hydrologic cycles and it is essential that discharge[s] of pollutants be 
controlled at the source.”66 Section 402 National Pollutant Discharge Elimination 
System (NPDES) is the keystone of direct federal powers over water pollution 
control.67 Although applicable to only point source discharges, the technology-
based limitations can be heavily influenced by nonpoint source loads into 
receiving waters because point source permit writers account for nonpoint source 
contributions into water bodies.68 States have also begun issuing NPDES permits 
with numeric nutrient limits, monitoring requirements, or requiring feasibility 
studies prior to upgrades.69  
Discussed below, EPA has placed backstop allocations on point sources in 
the Chesapeake Bay, to make up the difference in shared waterways when 
nonpoint sources fail to achieve their targets.70 Moreover, downstream states may 
                                                 
66 Andreen, supra note 12, at 267. 
67 33 U.S.C. § 1342(a) The Act generally prohibits the discharge of effluent into a navigable body 
of water unless the point source obtains a NPDES permit from a state with a EPA-approved permit 
program or from the EPA itself. 
68 40 C.F.R. § 122.44. 
69 EPA Hypoxia Task Force, Report to Congress 2015, 64, available at https://www.epa.gov/ms-
htf/htf-2015-report-congress [hereinafter HTF 2015 Report to Congress].  
70 See infra notes 121-171 for discussion about backstop allocations.  
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appeal to the EPA Administrator to disapprove a permit if concluded that the 
discharge will have an undue impact on interstate waters.71 By providing feedback 
for other states, this can provide downstream states such as Louisiana with a 
remedy to nudge Mississippi River Basin states into holding their own point 
source polluters accountable for downstream pollution.72 It further demonstrates 
the diverse effects of evolving nonpoint source dialogue.  
 
b. Designated Uses as Defaults 
 
Designating uses for each state water body acts as the fundamental driver 
of the Clean Water Act under section 303(c)(2)(A).73 Designated uses must at 
minimum reflect existing uses, but may also establish optimistic uses for a water 
body.74 In practice designated uses are much more than simply a means to classify 
a body of water, it also establishes the water quality goals.75  States are also 
required to take into consideration downstream waters in setting designated uses 
and water quality standards for its waters.76 Congressional preference for fishable 
and swimmable waters cannot be ignored. 77  Undeniably,” an Idaho court 
                                                 
71 Arkansas v. Oklahoma, 503 U.S. 91 (1992) (EPA may condition an NPDES permit on one 
state’s compliance with water quality standards of another state) (citing 40 C.F.R. § 122.4). 
72 This may be unlikely, as Louisiana was party to an amicus brief filed on behalf of a coalition of 
21 states against the Chesapeake Bay TMDL. However, it is important to note that the Attorney 
General of each state has discretion to file amicus briefs on behalf of their state, which might be 
“driven by a sincere interest to have their state's voice heard or, perhaps more cynically, politics.” 
Brandon D. Harper, The Effectiveness of State-Filed Amicus Briefs at the United States Supreme 
Court, 16 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1503, 1510-11 (2014). 
73 33 U.S.C. 1313(c)(2)(A) (2014) 
74 See generally 40 C.F.R. § 131.10 (2011); 40 C.F.R. § 131.3(f) (2014). Designated (beneficial) 
uses are “those uses specified in water quality standards for each water body or segment whether 
or not they are being attained.” 
75 33 U.S.C. § 1313 (2014). The designated use titles take into consideration their “use and value 
for public water supplies, propagation of fish and wildlife, recreational purposes, and agricultural, 
industrial, and other purposes, and also taking into consideration their use and value for 
navigation.” 
76 40 C.F.R. § 131.10.  
77 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(2) (2014). 
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remarked, “one of the over-arching purposes of the Clean Water Act is to achieve 
fishable/swimmable uses wherever attainable.”78  
Under the nudge theory, inertia can be a very powerful tool.79 Setting a 
default option can greatly influence the outcome, because research indicates 
people tend to stick with the automatic choices, even with significant decisions.80 
The Clean Water Act implicitly compels states to designate fishable and 
swimmable characteristics as the default uses for its waters. Where a state fails to 
designate a water body for that use, the state must conduct a use attainability 
analysis (“UAA”) to prove it could not meet this requirement, reviewing the 
analysis every three years. 81  Thereafter, changes in the designated uses are 
allowed only after a period of public comment. 82  The designated use 
determination is also subject to EPA review and modification. 83  Due to the 
hurdles imposed by this mechanism, states are more likely to stick with the 
default option. Review periods can provide interested parties an opportunity to 
contest a proposed use or removal of designated use, as state and federal entities 
are not the only parties that can nudge.84  
                                                 
78 Idaho Mining Ass'n, Inc. v. Browner, 90 F. Supp. 2d 1078 at 1097 (D. Idaho 2000). 
79 NUDGE, supra note 2, at 8. 
80 Id. at 84. 
81 See 40 C.F.R. § 131.20  
82 See 40 C.F.R. § 131.10(e); Kelso v. Rybachek, 912 P.2d 536 (Alaska 1996) (a group of miners 
unsuccessfully challenged the state's denial of their petition to reclassify certain streams to exclude 
all water uses except industrial use).  
83 See 40 C.F.R. §§ 131.5(a), 131.6(c), 131.11(a), (b); Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. U.S. 
E.P.A., 16 F.3d 1395, 1401 (4th Cir. 1993) (determining whether the states' dioxin criteria is 
scientifically defensible and protective of designated uses). 
84 40 C.F.R. § 131.10(g) States may remove a designated use which is not an existing use through 
a Use Attainability analysis based on 6 factors:  
(1) Naturally occurring pollutant concentrations prevent the attainment of the use; or 
(2) Natural, ephemeral, intermittent or low flow conditions or water levels prevent the attainment 
of the use, unless these conditions may be compensated for by the discharge of sufficient volume 
of effluent discharges without violating State water conservation requirements to enable uses to be 
met; or 
(3) Human caused conditions or sources of pollution prevent the attainment of the use and cannot 
be remedied or would cause more environmental damage to correct than to leave in place; or 
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 Designated uses provide a window into nudging meaningful aquatic 
system services because it sets in motion water quality development for that 
particular use. The Supreme Court in PUD No. 1 of Jefferson Cnty. v. Washington 
Dep't of Ecology determined a state could hold a federally licensed discharger 
accountable for not only the applicable water quality criteria, but also the 
designated use as salmon habitat.85 The Tenth Circuit upheld a revised designated 
use on behalf of a Native American tribe for ceremonial purposes.86 In the tidal 
waters of the Chesapeake Bay, USEPA developed designated uses for migratory 
fish spawning and nursery, shallow-water bay grass, open-water fish and 
shellfish, deep-water seasonal fish and shellfish, and deep-channel seasonal 
refuge.87  Under this scheme, many unorthodox designated uses could nudge and 
improve a water body’s quality, such as flood control or filtration.88 With these 
uses preserved, the state is obligated to set water quality criteria to protect those 
uses. 
 
c. Efficient Mapping & Expecting Error Through Water Quality 
Criteria  
 
                                                                                                                                     
(4) Dams, diversions or other types of hydrologic modifications preclude the attainment of the use, 
and it is not feasible to restore the water body to its original condition or to operate such 
modification in a way that would result in the attainment of the use; or 
(5) Physical conditions related to the natural features of the water body, such as the lack of a 
proper substrate, cover, flow, depth, pools, riffles, and the like, unrelated to water quality, preclude 
attainment of aquatic life protection uses; or 
(6) Controls more stringent than those required by sections 301(b) and 306 of the Act would result 
in substantial and widespread economic and social impact. 
85 PUD No. 1 of Jefferson Cnty. v. Washington Dep't of Ecology, 511 U.S. 700, 714 (1994). 
86 City of Albuquerque v. Browner, 97 F.3d 415, 427 (10th Cir. 1996). 
87 EPA, CHESAPEAKE BAY TOTAL MAXIMUM DAILY LOAD, 3-4 (2010), available at 
https://www.epa.gov/chesapeake-bay-tmdl/chesapeake-bay-tmdl-document [hereinafter BAY 
TMDL]. 
88 For example, Ohio EPA has proposed revisions that will include the addition of a lake habitat 
subcategory to the aquatic life designation. Kenneth Kilbert, Tiffany Tisler and M. Zack Hohl, 
Legal Tools for Reducing Harmful Algal Blooms in Lake Erie, 44 U. TOL. L. REV. 69, fn. 69 
(2012). 
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Once the state has identified the existing and designated uses for specified 
water segment, the state must develop water quality criteria representative of 
those uses.89 Water quality criteria are manifested in different forms, expressed as 
numeric, narrative, or both.90 One opinion provides a useful analogy to describe 
the difference: a state could adopt a numeric speed limit—70 miles per hour—or a 
narrative standard—don't drive too fast. Or a state could adopt a combination of 
both—don't drive over 70, and don't drive too fast for conditions.91 These criteria 
are subject to review and preemption by USEPA, which can establish new 
standards for the state if it finds the state-promulgated standards inconsistent with 
the requirements of the Act.92 Well-designed systems expect its users to make 
errors, and then provide an instrument to correct the error.93 The federal review 
statutory mechanism seeks to accommodate this concern by providing evaluation 
or possibly a proposed standard in the event the Administrator deems it 
necessary.94   
Similarly, the best frameworks help people improve their ability to 
navigate the choice architecture and select the options that improve their life 
through a nudge known as efficient mapping.95 This often entails transforming the 
available data into means that is accessible and most clearly comprehended.96 In 
the case of narrative standards, they tend to insert inefficiency into the process 
since there is no quantifiable target value that identifies the high-risk areas for 
                                                 
89 40 C.F.R. § 131.11(a) (2012). 
90 40 C.F.R. § 131.11(b) (2012). 
91 Florida Wildlife Fed'n, Inc. v. Jackson, 853 F. Supp. 2d 1138 at 1145-46 (N.D. Fla. 2012).  
92 “The Administrator shall promptly prepare and publish proposed regulations setting forth a 
revised or new water quality standard for the navigable waters involved-- (A) if a revised or new 
water quality standard submitted by such State under paragraph (3) of this subsection for such 
waters is determined by the Administrator not to be consistent with the applicable requirements of 
this chapter, or (B) in any case where the Administrator determines that a revised or new standard 
is necessary to meet the requirements of this chapter.” 33 U.S.C.A. § 1313(c)(4)(B). 
93 NUDGE, supra note 2, at 89. 
94 303(c)(4)(B). 
95 NUDGE, supra note 2, at 94. 
96 Id.   
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nutrient pollution.97 Numeric nutrient standards translate much more smoothly 
into tangible water quality protection by simplifying the process for identification 
and monitoring of impaired waters.98 States need to be proactively transforming 
narrative nutrient pollution into quantifiable values that more readily assist the 
regulatory agencies with navigating the choice architecture set by the Clean Water 
Act.99  
Everyone hates losses, but often people become so risk adverse that it 
precludes accepting a trade you otherwise would have made.100 While the process 
is still voluntary, states should be preemptively adopting numeric standards as it 
may ease the transition in favor of more lenient standards. At the same time, the 
potential for increased accountability generates fear among farm interest groups 
that numeric water quality standards will ultimately lead to regulating traditional 
nonpoint sources similar to point sources. Point source operators are weary they 
could bear the brunt of pollution reduction in shared waterways when nonpoint 
sources fail to adequately meet pollution targets, as seen in the Chesapeake Bay 
litigation.101 Lastly, states view numeric standards as a threat to their discretionary 
authority.102 Two cases in particular discussed below demonstrate the possible 
repercussions of failing to do so where environmental groups nudged by 
petitioning for federal intervention through review.103  Spurred in part by federal 
                                                 
97 Houck, supra note 38, at 10431. 
98 Without such standards, states are often unwilling to take restorative action. For example, 
“Illinois EPA has since determined that at this time TMDLs will only be developed for those 
parameters with numeric water quality standards. These numeric water quality standards will serve 
as the target endpoints for TMDL development and provide a greater degree of clarity and 
certainty about the TMDL and implementation plans.” Illinois EPA, TMDL REPORT FOR BIG 
MUDDY RIVER (2012) available at www.epa.state.il.us/water/tmdl/report/big-muddy-one/big-
muddy.pdf. 
99 Id.  
100 NUDGE, supra note 2, at 33.  
101 See infra notes 121-172. 
102 Houck, supra note 38, at 10431,  
103 See infra notes 121-172. 
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recognition of the need for numeric nutrient standards, citizen suits have and will 
play a powerful part in nudging the transition.  
 
d. Structuring Complex Choices in Impaired Waters with the Total 
Maximum Daily Load 
 
When waters within a state fail to meet the applicable criteria, numeric or 
narrative, the Clean Water Act requires the state to identify and distinguish these 
as “impaired waters,” placing them on the 303(d) list.104 Listing of a water body 
as impaired typically leads to development of a total maximum daily load 
(TMDL), or “pollution diet”. 105  The TMDL is a limitation on the receiving 
pollution for a body of water subject to the review of the USEPA Administrator, 
who may develop a TMDL for that state in absence of statutory compliance.106 
TMDLs are composed of “load allocations,” for nonpoint source pollution, and 
“wasteload allocations,” for point source pollution. 107  Flexibility to structure 
TMDL composition depending on contributing sources and ancillary regulatory 
powers have built the TMDL into a truly formidable mechanism for nudging.108  
In the past, USEPA would collect and compile the impaired waters reports 
and submit biennial surface water quality reports to Congress. 109  Recently, 
USEPA has switched to the web accessible ATTAINS technology for 
                                                 
104 33 U.S.C. § 1313(d)(1)(A).  
105 40 CFR 130.2 (i). “The sum of the individual WLAs for point sources and LAs for nonpoint 
sources and natural background. If a receiving water has only one point source discharger, the 
TMDL is the sum of that point source WLA plus the LAs for any nonpoint sources of pollution 
and natural background sources, tributaries, or adjacent segments. TMDLs can be expressed in 
terms of either mass per time, toxicity, or other appropriate measure. If Best Management 
Practices (BMPs) or other nonpoint source pollution controls make more stringent load allocations 
practicable, then wasteload allocations can be made less stringent. Thus, the TMDL process 
provides for nonpoint source control tradeoffs.” 
106 33 U.S.C. § 1313(d)(1)(c). 
107 40 C.F.R § 130.2(g)-(i). 
108 See infra notes 121-172. 
109 33 U.S.C 1313(d); 33 U.S.C 1315. 
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congressional reporting to promote public awareness. 110  This technological 
transformation is a crucial component of modern nudging, as USEPA interprets 
its responsibility to congressionally report influences awareness among local 
stakeholders and streamlines a comprehensive system of reporting for states.111 
The increased accessibility leads to greater public awareness and participation in 
the water quality protection, particularly through citizen suit enforcement under 
section 505.112 
Agency nudging through TMDL configuration took a pivotal turn with the 
Ninth Circuit holding in Pronsolino v. Nastri. 113  The court found TMDL 
requirements based on a water body containing solely nonpoint sources to be 
within the discretion of USEPA’s authority.114 Local landowners argued that by 
establishing TMDLs for waters impaired only by nonpoint source pollution, 
USEPA had “upset the balance of federal-state control established in the CWA by 
intruding into the states' traditional control over land use.”115  Owing deference to 
the Agency interpretation, the court reasoned, “neither the statute nor the 
regulations specify the load of pollutants that may be received from particular 
parcels of land or describe what measures the state should take to implement the 
TMDL.” 116  Section 303 expressly preserves TMDL implementation and 
monitoring for state control, thus this arrangement preserved those traditional 
state functions.117  
                                                 
110 See infra note 13. 
111 NUDGE, supra note 2, at 191; 42 U.S.C. § 11001 et. seq. Reporting under the Emergency 
Planning and Community Right-to-know Act (EPCRA) had the effect of publicly shaming 
egregious as a means to improve the environment . 
112 33 U.S.C 1365 (2014). 
113 Pronsolino v. Nastri, 291 F.3d 1123, 1127 (9th Cir. 2002). 
114 Id.  TMDL development in the Garcia River required loggers at significant cost to mitigate 
90% of sediment run-off from logging activities and limit harvesting during certain times of the 
year. 
115 Id. at 1140. 
116 Id.  
117 Id. 
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Pronsolino highlights an important dynamic of federal power under 
section 303. While the federal government may have a license to develop total 
maximum daily loads for impaired navigable waters from nonpoint sources, 
generally enforcement on the individual sources must come from the states. In the 
wake of Pronsolino, the void of implementation powers could undermine the 
effectiveness of a TMDL, rendering it little more than an informational document. 
USEPA’s unprecedented approach in the Chesapeake Bay, explained in more 
detail below, pushes the boundaries on implementation authority and agency 
deference in TMDL development. In the litigation thus far, the courts have 
allowed the federal government to ensure the effectiveness of the TMDLs by 
requiring EPA to play a larger role post-TMDL development and thus depart from 
Pronsolino.  
The statutory mechanisms discussed in the previous sections have the 
potential to nudge the Agency into an expanded role with novel interpretations of 
existing laws, but their practicality is subject to judicial interpretation. When 
Agency action or inaction results in the adversarial process, courts play the 
fundamental role of preserving the balance between the libertarianism and 
paternalism of a nudge. 
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PART III: WHEN DOES A NUDGE BECOME A SHOVE: NUTRIENT 
LITIGATION  
 
Architects attempt to nudge people in ways that will benefit their lives in 
some way.118 Inherently this introduces bias into the available choices because 
architects use subjective judgments to decide the appropriate balance between 
impinging freedoms and life improvements.119 Generally courts are insulated from 
the political pressures felt by elected and agency officials. Thus as interpreters of 
the statutory language and reviewers of final agency action, the court represents a 
very powerful entity by reconciling the proper balance of interests within a 
proposed nudge.120 This section will examine three regional lawsuits that seek to 
remedy the declining fishing industry in the Chesapeake Bay, widespread hypoxia 
in the Gulf of Mexico, and impaired waterways in Florida and further illustrate 
the predominance of the judiciary in setting a new course for improving water 
quality.  
 
a. Structuring the Chesapeake Bay Total Maximum Daily Load 
 
The Chesapeake Bay’s waning aquatic health spurred response from 
regulatory and management initiatives throughout the 20th century, including 
Memorandum of Understanding,121 specific statutory provisions122, water quality 
                                                 
118 NUDGE, supra note 2, at 250 (“Our basic conclusion is that the evaluation of nudges depends 
on their effects-on whether they hurt people or help them”).  
119 Id. at 249-250.  
120 Id. (“The potential for beneficial nudging also depends on the ability of the Nudgers to make 
good guesses about what is best for the Nudgees. In general Nudgers will be able to make good 
guesses when they have much more expertise at their disposal, and…when differences in tastes 
and needs can be easily detected”). 
121 CHESAPEAKE BAY PROGRAM, CHESAPEAKE 2000 (2000), available at 
http://chesapeakebay.net/agreement.htm.  
122 33 U.S.C. § 1267 (2015) 
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agreements123, executive orders124, litigation and consent decrees125, and specific 
criteria guidance,126 however these did little to slow the rapid deterioration.127 
Resolving a number of consent decrees and responding to President Obama’s 
Executive order to restore and protect the Bay, The Chesapeake Bay Total 
Maximum Daily Load identifies the requisite pollution reductions across 
Delaware, Maryland, New York, Pennsylvania, Virginia, West Virginia and the 
District of Columbia.128 More than 40,000 TMDLs have been completed across 
the United States, but the Chesapeake Bay TMDL is the most compelling and 
complex.129 The rigorous plan to restore clean water to the Chesapeake Bay states 
covers 64,000 square mile watershed, the largest TMDL to date.130 Reflecting the 
unique physical, chemical, and biological characteristics of portions of water 
bodies, the Bay TMDL is actually an aggregate of 92 smaller TMDLs for three 
pollutants: nitrogen, phosphorus, and sediment.131  
Yet the size of the Bay TMDL is not the only controversial component of 
the TMDL. EPA required states to address nonpoint source runoff by providing 
states with the framework for nudging landowner decisions. Instead of a single 
number representative of the maximum receiving load for that body of water, the 
TMDL allocates pollutant limits for source sectors, particularly agriculture, urban 
                                                 
123 BAY TMDL, supra note 87, at 1-3. 
124 Exec. Order No. 13,508, 3 C.F.R. 23,099 (2009) [hereinafter CHESAPEAKE EXECUTIVE ORDER].  
125 See Dioxin/Organochlorine Center v. Clarke, 57 F.3d 1517 (9th Cir. 1995); Scott v. City of 
Hammond, 741 F.2d 992 (7th Cir. 1984); American Canoe Assn. v EPA, 54 F.Supp.2d 621 
(E.D.Va. 1999). 
126 EPA, AMBIENT WATER QUALITY CRITERIA FOR DISSOLVED OXYGEN, WATER CLARITY AND 
CHLOROPHYLL A FOR CHESAPEAKE BAY AND ITS TIDAL TRIBUTARIES, (2003) available at: 
http://www.epa.gov/region3/chesapeake/baycriteria/Criteria_Final.pdf 
127 BAY TMDL, supra note 87, at 1-3. 
128 See infra notes 120-126. 
129 BAY TMDL, supra note 87, ES-3. 
130 Id. at ES-1. 
131 Id.  
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stormwater, and wastewater.132 As a feature of its accountability framework, the 
TMDL requires each state to submit “watershed improvement plans” (WIPs) that 
provide “reasonable assurances” of implementation, including deadlines for states 
to implement its identified control measures.133 With representation of reasonable 
assurances, EPA could reliably allocate loadings to point sources knowing states 
had both the means and the timeline to achieve nonpoint load reductions.134 EPA 
also included contingencies in the TMDL for noncompliance, termed “backstop 
measures,” which threatened tighter restrictions on point sources and frequent 
objections to NPDES permits.135 Shortly after the final document was published, 
national agricultural and residential associations filed suit contesting EPA’s 
authority and their proposed equilibrium of freedoms and benefits.136  
 
                                                 
132 BAY TMDL, supra note 87, at 4-5 EPA determined the permit allocations of these sectors by 
considering inputs from the following sectors: agriculture, wastewater, forest, nontidal 
atmospheric deposition, onsite septic, and urban. 
133 Id. at 7-5 Specifically they required the WIPs to: 
1. Identify the controls needed to achieve the allocations identified in the Bay TMDL through 
revised tributary strategies. 
2. Identify the current state and local capacity to achieve the needed controls (i.e., an assessment 
of current funding programs for point source permitting/treatment upgrades and nonpoint source 
controls, programmatic capacity, regulations, legislative authorities). 
3. Identify the gaps in current programs that must be filled to achieve the needed controls (i.e., 
additional incentives, state or local regulatory programs, market-based tools, technical or financial 
assistance, new legislative authorities). 
4. A commitment from each jurisdiction to work to systematically fill the identified gaps. As part 
of this commitment, the jurisdictions would agree to meet specific, iterative, and short-term (1-2 
year) milestones demonstrating increased levels of implementation or nitrogen, phosphorus, and 
sediment load reduction. 
5. A commitment to continue efforts underway to expand monitoring, tracking, and reporting 
directed to assessing the effectiveness of implementation actions and to use the data to drive 
adaptive decision making and redirect management actions. 
6. Agreement that if the jurisdictions do not meet the commitments, additional measures might be 
necessary. 
134 Id. at 7-1. 
135 Id.; ES-10. 
136 Am. Farm Bureau Fed'n v. U.S. E.P.A., 984 F. Supp. 2d 289, 324 (M.D. Pa. 2013) aff'd, 792 
F.3d 281 (3d Cir. 2015) (“Moreover, although Plaintiffs believe that this process was coercive, it 
is noteworthy that no state has filed suit challenging the TMDL, let alone alleged that their 
participation in the TMDL drafting process was a result of coercion”)  
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1. Backlash in the Bay: Challenging the TMDL 
 
Disputing the fine line drawn by EPA between coercion and incentivizing, 
agricultural interest groups (collectively, “Farm Bureau”) assembled against the 
TMDL. 137  The plaintiffs first took issue with the detailed allocations of the 
TMDL, including the both the sector allocations, and the calculation of a TMDL 
as the sum of a Waste Load Allocation and a Load Allocation. 138  These 
allocations, plaintiffs argued, far exceeded the statutory authority of section 
303(d), which only permitted USEPA to establish a single figure as the total 
maximum daily load for a water body, but not to allocate that load or describe 
how it is to be achieved.139 A limitation on the available source reduction pool, 
according to Farm Bureau, was not a nudge but rather coercive action as it 
severely restrained the states’ available choices to meet the requisite TMDL 
levels. 
Plaintiffs further contended the final TMDL hindered traditional state’s 
rights to implementation with the required demonstrations of “reasonable 
assurances” of the nonpoint source load reductions in the WIPs 140  The 
prescriptive mechanisms for insuring state compliance went beyond EPA’s 
authority, and in fact many of the initial WIPs were deemed insufficient and 
subjected to backstop authority.141 Here, the Farm Bureau claimed, “EPA may 
issue a TMDL, EPA has no authority to implement a TMDL,” and the reasonable 
assurances were simply a means for EPA to insert itself into an area that 
Congress, through cooperative federalism, reserved for the states.142   
                                                 
137 Id. at 329. 
138 40 C.F.R. § 130.2(i) 
139 Am. Farm Bureau Fed'n, 984 F. Supp. 2d at 316. 
140 Id.  
141 Id. at 304. EPA found that many of the draft Phase I WIPs did not meet their target goal and 
therefore adjusted the allocations accordingly. 
142 Id.  
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Moreover, the holistic watershed approach taken in the TMDL was 
challenged on the basis that EPA did not have authority to set allocations for the 
headwater jurisdictions of Pennsylvania, New York, and West Virginia, which do 
not actually border the Chesapeake Bay.143 Because EPA’s power is derivative of 
the state, Farm Bureau averred EPA had no authority reach into other states, in 
effect allowing states to set TMDLs against other states and going beyond the 
traditional nonpoint boundaries.144  
 
2. District court decision 
 
Symbolic of efficient mapping and structuring choices, the court agreed 
with the Agency’s functionalist approach in apportioning load allocations to 
sources because it guided states to selecting reductions from specific areas instead 
of one large pool.145 Deferring to EPA’s technical judgment, the court explained: 
“To merely set a number, and then let the states, permit writers, and other groups 
within each state ‘duke it out’ would not only be impractical, but would also be 
inconsistent with the CWA's foundational principle, which is that the burdens of 
eliminating pollution in the Nation's water is one to be shared among federal, 
state, and local authorities.” 146  Moreover, narrowing the range of available 
pollution sectors still preserved flexibility because it did no more than nudge the 
states into selecting reductions from specific categories, rather than increase the 
total reductions required or regulate to individual sources. 147 
                                                 
143 Id. at 329. 
144 Id.  
145 Id at 322 (“To do otherwise, i.e., to simply give a number to an entire municipal sewer system, 
consisting of multiple sources of point source pollution, and then letting multiple permit writers 
attempt to attain that allocation, does not make sense because, as the court pointed out, the 
individual permit writers would lack the coordination required to effectively “divvy up acceptable 
pollution levels among [the sources]”). 
146 Id. 
147 Id. at 328.  
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Similarly, requiring reasonable assurances was not an unlawful 
implementation plan, particularly because the states were not required to 
implement Agency promulgated TMDLs; they could very well fashion and submit 
their own for EPA review.148 Assurances were simply a basis against which to 
measure practicality of a state standard and provide feedback while reserving 
EPA backstop authority pursuant to section 303(d). 149  Without reasonable 
assurances of the achievability of nonpoint source reductions, waste load 
allocations could not be accurately calculated resulting in water quality falling 
short of its goals.150 Unrealistic optimism is a common aspect of everyday life, 
and in the absence of a nudge it tends to preclude people from taking preventive 
or rational steps.151  Without some type of mutual timeline and assurances of 
implementation, it would be naive to expect a favorable ecosystem response in the 
near future.152  
The court also found the watershed scale to be consistent with, if not 
required by the language in §303(d), which mandates water quality standards be 
implemented at “a level necessary to implement the applicable water quality 
standards.” 153  This approach more accurately accounts for natural 
hydrogeological processes and relieves part of the pressure on both nonpoint and 
point sources from achieving the goals in receiving states by nudging an 
alignment of incentives for all states in the watershed.154  
                                                 
148 Id. at 314. EPA may not, for example, dictate to a state what measures the state must undertake 
to reduce pollution from a particular source.  
149 Id. at 325. 
150 Id. at 326. 
151 NUDGE, supra note 2, at 32.  
152 Am. Farm Bureau Fed'n v. U.S. E.P.A., 792 F.3d 281, 308 (3d Cir. 2015) cert. denied sub nom. 
Am. Farm Bureau Fed'n v. E.P.A., No. 15-599, 2016 WL 763272 (U.S. Feb. 29, 2016) (Moreover, 
even Farm Bureau “agree[d] with EPA that developing source limits, assurances, and deadlines is 
useful”).  
153Id. (citing 33 U.S.C. § 1313(d)(1)(C)); 40 C.F.R. § 131.10. 
154 NUDGE, supra note 2, at 186. 
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Shortly after the district court rendered is decision and granted summary 
judgment on behalf of EPA, the Farm Bureau filed for appeal to the Third Circuit. 
 
3. Chesapeake Taking Center Stage on Appeal 
 
Ambiguity in the regulatory language again spurred debate of whether 
deference was owed under Chevron, but the resulting tension within the 
cooperative framework posed even greater constitutional questions for the Third 
Circuit.155 Under the two-step Chevron framework, the court first approached the 
relevant TMDL precedent and statutory text in the context of the statutory 
structure and purpose, but found nothing dispositive in the traditional analysis.156  
 Underlying its analysis under step 1 of Chevron, the court placed priority 
on the canons of federalism and constitutional avoidance.157 Anchoring against 
the jurisdictional challenges in Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook Cty. v. U.S. Army 
Corps of Engineers (SWANCC)158  and Rapanos v. United States,159  the court 
viewed the sector allocations and reasonable assurances as not “so coercive as to 
pass the point at which pressure turns into compulsion,” thus impinging on 
traditional state land-use authority.160 Recognizing that Congress may regulate 
                                                 
155 Am. Farm Bureau Fed'n 792 F.3d at 301. 
156 See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984) The seminal 
Supreme Court decision in Chevron developed the widely used two-part test for determining 
whether to grant deference to an agency interpretation. Part 1 of the test asks if the statute is 
ambiguous, and if so, step two asks if the agency decision is reasonable based on a permissible 
construction of the statute.   
157 Am. Farm Bureau Fed'n 792 F.3d at 301. 
158 531 U.S. 159 (2001) The Supreme Court held that Corps' rule extending definition of 
“navigable waters” under CWA to include intrastate waters used as habitat by migratory birds 
exceeded authority granted to Corps under CWA. 
159 547 U.S. 715 (2006) The Supreme Court held that term “navigable waters,” under CWA, 
includes only relatively permanent, standing or flowing bodies of water, not intermittent or 
ephemeral flows of water, and only those wetlands with a continuous surface connection to bodies 
that are waters of the United States in their own right are adjacent to such waters and covered by 
the CWA. 
160 Am. Farm Bureau Fed'n, 792 F.3d at 304. 
  30  
channels of interstate commerce and the Bay clearly fell within this realm, the 
court found no commerce clause dispute so egregious that it usurped state’s 
rights. 161  The Bay TMDL simply did not elicit the same constitutional and 
federalism concerns as SWANCC and Rapanos, and as a result, found the term 
susceptible to multiple meanings.162  Acknowledging the practicality of source 
allocations, deadlines, and reasonable assurances in furthering the goals of the 
Act, the court deferred to EPA’s interpretation with the comment, “the EPA's 
approach makes sense.”163  
Although the court felt “the winners are environmental groups, the states 
that border the Bay, tourists, fishermen, municipal waste water treatment works, 
and urban centers” and the “losers are rural counties with farming operations, 
nonpoint source polluters, the agricultural industry, and those states that would 
prefer a lighter touch from the EPA,” in reality the lines are not so definitive.164 
First, recall nothing necessarily prevents the Bay states from developing their own 
plan for implementation and in principle preserving choice, however pursuant to a 
considerably stricter standard for EPA’s approval. Second, consider the likelihood 
of cost sharing by way of agricultural goods or taxes, thus lessening the impact of 
individual costs while also incentivizing innovation in nutrient control 
measures. 165  Further, EPA expressly accommodated nutrient credit trading 
programs in the Bay TMDL, another cost-efficient nudge. 166  Overall, EPA’s 
                                                 
161 See Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook Cty. v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 531 U.S. 159, 174 
(2001) Permitting respondents to claim federal jurisdiction over ponds and mudflats falling within 
the “Migratory Bird Rule” would result in a significant impingement of the States' traditional and 
primary power over land and water use.  
162 NUDGE, supra note 2, at 23. 
163 Am. Farm Bureau Fed'n 792 F.3d at 309.  
164 Id. at 309-10  
165 Simpson, R. David, and Robert L. Bradford III. "Taxing variable cost: Environmental 
regulation as industrial policy." 30 JOURNAL OF ENVIRONMENTAL ECONOMICS AND 
MANAGEMENT 282 (1996). 
166 BAY TMDL, supra note 87, at 10-3; Nutrient credit trading mechanisms are one form of 
nudging that can be easily replicated in other watersheds, see Chesapeake Bay Commission, 
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nudge was considered in light of a congressional declaration “that the states and 
the EPA could, working together, best allocate the benefits and burdens of 
lowering pollution.” 167  In the context of choice architecture, the Bay TMDL 
fosters efficient mapping by fortifying connections between water quality 
standards and the deployment of physical conservation measures to attain actual 
reductions.168 
In light of the denial of the petition for writ of certiorari, the Bay TMDL is 
now the ideal framework for environmental groups seeking widespread nonpoint 
source management.169 Theoretically under an analogous program, states can be 
nudged to reduce nonpoint source loads from specific sectors of discharges, 
require realistic obligations of implementation, and align the interests of all states 
within or draining into a watershed. 170  In fact, E.O. 13508 Chesapeake Bay 
Protection and Restoration explicitly requests EPA develop pollution control 
techniques that “can be replicated in efforts to protect other bodies of water”171 
Whether this approach is replicated well remain to be seen, as past EPA 
Administrator Lisa Jackson indicated, “EPA has decided not to apply its 
Chesapeake Bay model for reducing pollution to the Upper Mississippi River 
Basin.” Instead, Jackson indicated the EPA might look at ways to quantify how 
voluntary conservation methods in the Mississippi River Basin are helping reduce 
hypoxia in the Gulf of Mexico.172  
                                                                                                                                     
Chesapeake Bay: An Economic Study (2012) available at https://www.epa.gov/chesapeake-bay-
tmdl/comments-epa-evaluations-trading-and-offset-programs-chesapeake-bay-watershed 
167 Am. Farm Bureau Fed'n, 792 F.3d at 310. 
168 See infra notes 247-250 on voluntary best management practices. 
169 MASSIVE PROBLEMS, supra note 18, at 116.  
170 Jon Cannon, Choices and Institutions in Watershed Management, 25 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. 
& POL'Y REV. 379, 380 (2000) (“The success of the Chesapeake Bay Program is apparent from an 
increasingly elaborate and specific set of mutual undertakings among the parties and from 
reductions in the costs of cooperation among them”). 
171 CHESAPEAKE EXECUTIVE ORDER, supra note 124. 
172 IOWA NUTRIENT REDUCTION STRATEGY, 13 (2014) available at 
http://www.nutrientstrategy.iastate.edu/documents. 
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b. Nudging in the Mississippi River Basin: Transparency, Mapping, 
and Expecting Error 
 
Environmental problems are created when interests are unaligned, but 
become manifestly amplified when people do not get feedback on the 
environmental consequences of their actions, revealing the classic Tragedy of the 
Commons dilemma. 173  As the ultimate drainage endpoint for the Mississippi 
River, the Gulf of Mexico accumulates the heavily contaminated waters of the 
United States’ most agriculturally intensive lands. The Gulf is home to one of the 
most prominent marine ecosystems in the world, containing an abundance of 
aquatic wildlife and a once thriving 2.8 billion per year fishing industry. 174 
Currently, it is also home to the largest hypoxic dead zone in the United States, 
spanning 7,700 square miles, about the size of the state of Massachusetts.175  
Much like climate change, there is little scientific debate on the cause of the 
immense deterioration; large applications of nitrogen-based fertilizers and runoff 
of nutrients into the Atchafalaya and Mississippi Rivers contribute to nutrient 
over enrichment and the creation of a seasonal zone of hypoxic (oxygen-deficient) 
waters, decimating the ecological and economical use of the Gulf. 176 Unlike the 
Chesapeake Bay, however, EPA has resisted action. 
 
1. Call for Action  
 
                                                 
173 NUDGE, supra note 2, at 187 (“even if you know about the connection, it is probably not salient 
to your behavior”); see Allen G. Good, and Perrin H. Beatty. Fertilizing Nature: A Tragedy of 
Excess in the Commons. PLOS BIOL 9.8 (2011). 
174 Id. 
175 EPA, EPA-SAB-08-003, HYPOXIA IN THE NORTHERN GULF OF MEXICO: AN UPDATE BY THE 
EPA SCIENCE ADVISORY BOARD, at 14 (2007), available at 
http://water.epa.gov/type/watersheds/named/msbasin/tfproducts.cfm#sab. 
176 NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL. NUTRIENT CONTROL ACTIONS FOR IMPROVING WATER 
QUALITY IN THE MISSISSIPPI RIVER BASIN AND NORTHERN GULF OF MEXICO at 11 (2009). 
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In 2008 a coalition of environmental groups spearheaded by the Gulf 
Restoration Network (“Gulf Restoration”) petitioned EPA to develop numeric 
nutrient criteria for nitrogen and phosphorus for every state in which they had not 
yet been established, or at a minimum, the states in the Mississippi River Basin. 
Gulf Restoration claimed §303(c)(4)(B) of the Act, EPA’s medium for expecting 
error, required EPA prepare and publish water quality standards “in any case 
where the administrator determines that a revised or new standard is necessary to 
meet the requirements of this chapter.”177 For the Gulf, they argued, this was most 
assuredly necessary, alleging that lack of numeric criteria within Mississippi 
River Atchafalaya River Basin (MARB) states, past EPA recognition of water 
quality problems, and available scientific data made it clear the EPA needed to 
step in.178  Essentially, Gulf Restoration believed error was evident, and EPA 
needed to activate its tool to nudge the correct procedure. This approach would 
utilize federal authority to map narrative criteria into numeric standards for a 
significant portion of the country. 
After three years delay and under threat of suit in 2011, EPA denied the 
petition, reasoning that using its rulemaking authority in this way would be 
“unprecedented and complex,” and that it preferred to support the “states-first” 
approach. 179  Pointing to the guidance known as the Stoner Memo, EPA 
sidestepped the question, explaining it was not determining numeric criteria are 
not ultimately necessary, but rather believed the most effective way to address 
excess nutrients is cooperation with the states. 180  Gulf Restoration’s request 
                                                 
177 33 U.S.C. § 1313(c)(4). 
178 Gulf Restoration Network v. Jackson, No. CIV.A. 12-677, 2013 WL 5328547 (E.D. La. Sept. 
20, 2013), vacated and remanded sub nom. Gulf Restoration Network v. McCarthy, 783 F.3d 227 
(5th Cir. 2015). 
179 Id. at 3. 
180 EPA, WORKING IN PARTNERSHIP WITH STATES TO ADDRESS PHOSPHORUS AND NITROGEN 
POLLUTION THROUGH USE OF A FRAMEWORK FOR STATE NUTRIENT REDUCTIONS (2011), 
available at http://www2.epa.gov/nutrient-policy-data/nitrogen-and-phosphorus-pollution-data-
access-tool [hereinafter STONER MEMO] Relying on a 2011 EPA guidance memorandum, known 
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revealed a high degree of unrealistic optimism.181 
 
2. Lawsuit Challenging the Denial 
 
In 2012, Gulf Restoration filed suit in the Eastern District of Louisiana in 
response to the EPA’s denial of their petition for rulemaking. 182  Relying on 
Massachusetts v. EPA,183 the environmental groups claimed EPA acted arbitrarily 
when it neglected to even decide whether numeric nutrient criteria were necessary 
or not, and whether EPA could rely on any other information (i.e., policy or 
administrative) to achieve this result.184  Massachusetts overturned EPA’s denial 
of a petition for rulemaking seeking to force greenhouse gas regulation, allowing 
a denial only where EPA could provide a reasonable explanation based on the 
Clean Air Act.185  
The District Court was thus faced not only with the question is of whether 
an agency decision is reviewable, but whether the EPA can refuse to make a 
decision, and if that decision can be based on non-statutory factors. Agreeing with 
Gulf Restoration, the court held EPA “lacks the discretion to simply decline to 
make the threshold determination in response to a rulemaking petition,” directing 
EPA to make a decision but permitting the response on policy factors.186 Under 
this precedent, environmental groups could wield tremendous power through 
                                                                                                                                     
as the ‘Stoner Memo,’ which outlines an 8-stage plan to work in partnership with states to address 
phosphorus and nitrogen pollution for nutrient reductions. Although affirming its commitment to 
the cooperative relationship with states, the memo asserted USEPA believes numeric nutrient 
criteria “are ultimately necessary for effective state programs.” 
181 NUDGE, supra note 2, at 31. 
182 Gulf Restoration Network, No. CIV.A. 12-677, at *1 
183 Massachusetts v. E.P.A., 549 U.S. 497 (2007). 
184 Gulf Restoration Network, No. CIV.A. 12-677, at *1 
185 Massachusetts v. E.P.A., 549 U.S. 497 (2007) (“EPA can avoid taking regulatory action with 
respect to greenhouse gas emissions from new motor vehicles only if it determines that 
greenhouse gases do not contribute to climate change or if it provides some reasonable explanation 
as to why it cannot or will not exercise its discretion to determine whether they do.”)  
186 Gulf Restoration Network, No. CIV.A. 12-677, at 7. 
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citizen suits, as they could appropriate the federal mechanism for expecting error, 
the necessity determination, and hijack agency resources to remedy situations 
where citizen groups perceived error. To prevent this unsolicited transfer of 
authority, appeal was filed shortly thereafter.  
 
3. Decisions, Decisions 
 
Reinterpreting Massachusetts, the Fifth Circuit upheld Agency discretion 
to refuse making a necessity determination, yet ensured transparency by requiring 
any ensuing explanation to be based on factors identified in the language of the 
statute.187 According to the Fifth Circuit, Massachusetts therefore does not stand 
for the proposition there exists a per se requirement of agency response to a 
petition for rulemaking, as the District Court interpreted, but rather the Agency 
lacks discretion to base its reasons on factors not grounded in the statute.188 EPA’s 
rationale for denial must “provide an adequate explanation, grounded in the 
statute.”189  
Again we see choice architecture in the works, as the Fifth Circuit largely 
laid out an error proof structure for EPA’s arguments on remand by delineating 
what constitutes sufficiently reasoned justification for denial of a necessity 
determination. EPA will likely reassert the arguments proffered with the petition 
denial, so long as it justifies those decisions with clear textual support in the 
statute.190 EPA’s initial commitment to continue working with states on MARB 
pollution controls appears to comport with statutory embodiment of congressional 
policy “to recognize, preserve, and protect the primary responsibilities and rights 
                                                 
187 Gulf Restoration Network v. McCarthy, 783 F.3d 227, 239 (5th Cir. 2015) (“The agency cannot 
rely on alternative policy grounds, even if reasonable, if those explanations do not find clear 
textual support.”)  
188 Id. at 243. 
189 Id. 
190 Id. at 239. 
  36  
of States to prevent, reduce, and eliminate pollution,” and thus may statutorily 
justify the denial.191  This court-endorsed defense to a section 303(c)(4)(b) citizen 
suit is a severe detriment to the force of nudging under the necessity doctrine 
because it limits the scope of the response to an error in the system to agency 
discretion. 192   EPA thus has discretion on whether to map in response to 
demonstrated error.  
Nudging often toes a fine line between simply influencing people’s 
choices and improper manipulation that detaches the voluntariness of the 
choice.193 Improper motives such as personal gain or a desire to control may cloud 
otherwise favorable choice architecture. As a remedy, good guidance through 
nudging removes deceit from structure by promoting transparency while 
implementing nudges.194 With this in mind, the Fifth Circuit struck a balance 
between preserving EPA discretion and transparency in the decision-making 
process by requiring reasoning grounded in the statute. 
Some scholars have noted that there has been no discussion of TMDL 
development in the Gulf, which clearly would qualify as impaired.195  TMDL 
building would have to occur at a watershed level, because as one author noted, 
“Louisiana could close the state down and still have a world-leading dead 
zone.”196 Given the precedent set in the Third Circuit, there exists speculation that 
environmental groups will seek to replicate the Bay TMDL in the Mississippi 
                                                 
191 33 U.S.C. § 1251(b) 
192 See Laura Kerr, Compelling A Nutrient Pollution Solution: How Nutrient Pollution Litigation 
Is Redefining Cooperative Federalism Under the Clean Water Act, 44 ENVTL. L. 1219, 1221 
(2014) 
193 NUDGE, supra note 2, at 247.  
194 Id. at 247-8. 
195 See Megan Galey, The Role of Water Quality Trading in Total Maximum Daily Load 
Programs, ABA AGRIC. MGMT. COMMITTEE NEWSL, at 10, 12 (2014); see also Michael M. 
Wenig, How "Total" Are "Total Maximum Daily Loads" ?-Legal Issues Regarding the Scope of 
Watershed-Based Pollution Control Under the Clean Water Act, 12 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 87, 187 
(1998). 
196 Houck, supra note 38 at 10434. 
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River Basin.197 With the exception of its own statutory provision in the Act198, 
water quality efforts in the MARB have taken a similar trajectory as remediation 
efforts in the Bay prior to the TMDL.199 Key differences, however, may hinder 
this prospect, and raises questions of whether a centralized body is the right 
method to map numeric development in the Gulf. 
Spatially, the MARB covers some 1,245,000 square miles, roughly twenty 
times the size of the Chesapeake Bay Watershed.200  Agriculturally productive 
land in the entire Chesapeake Bay Watershed covers roughly 6,500,000 acres, 
about 25% of the acres dedicated to agriculture in just Minnesota.201 If the scope 
of the Bay TMDL was unprecedented and complex, a Mississippi River Basin 
TMDL almost seems inconceivable. Geographically, the Chesapeake Bay is a 
predominant fixture in the northeast community where three of the six states 
physically border the Bay, and this communal interest may have enticed the states 
to capitulate to federal TMDL development.202 While clearly the Gulf of Mexico 
is economically and ecologically significant, it is far more removed from the 
contributing pollutant sources upstream the Mississippi River, and thus markedly 
                                                 
197 Galey, supra note 196, at 12.  
198 In 1998, Congress passed the Harmful Algal Bloom and Hypoxia Research and Control Act 
(HABHRCA) to address HABs that impacted living marine resources, fish and shellfish harvests 
and recreational and service industries along the U.S. coastal waters. 33 U.S.C. § 4004, Pub.L. 
105-383, Title VI, § 604, Nov. 13, 1998. 
199 Similar to the Chesapeake Bay, the Gulf of Mexico has had a Task Force formed, Executive 
Order drafted, and been the subject of litigation. See Exec. Order No. 13,554, 3 C.F.R. 62,313 
(2010)  
200 The Mississippi River originates as a tiny outlet stream from Lake Itasca in northern 
Minnesota. During a meandering 2,350 mile journey south to the Gulf of Mexico, the Mississippi 
River is joined by hundreds of tributaries, including the Ohio and Missouri Rivers. Water from 
parts or all of 31 states drains into the Mississippi River, and creates a drainage basin over 
1,245,000 square miles in size. Before reaching the Gulf, the Mississippi meets up with its 
distributary, the Atchafalaya River. EPA, Mississippi River/Gulf of Mexico Hypoxia Task Force, 
available at http://www.epa.gov/ms-htf/mississippiatchafalaya-river-basin-marb (last accessed 
March 23, 2016). 
201 Frank J. Coale, Proceedings of the 2012 Crop Pest Management Shortcourse & Minnesota 
Crop Production Retailers Association Trade Show (2012) available at 
www.extension.umn.edu/AgProfessionals. 
202 See Daniel C. Esty, Revitalizing Environmental Federalism, 95 MICH. L. REV. 570, 641 (1996) 
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prone to environmental externalities.203  Possibly the most vital distinguishing 
factor, however, is the lack of numeric nutrient standards among MARB states, 
and any coordinated and accountable association to implement them.204 Without a 
centralized and dependable organization of states to nudge participation among 
one another, there can be little assurance that reduction measures will be 
implemented. 205  Statutory requirements do mandate TMDL development for 
impaired waters, however the first step in the progression generally begins with 
numeric standard setting.206 Thus mapping through numeric standards may have 
to occur at individual state level for the MARB. Litigation in Florida, described 
below, illustrates complications over this phase nested within the cooperative 
federalism operable balance.  
 
c. Florida Wildlife Federation v. Jackson: Expecting Error and 
Efficient Mapping 
 
The litigation out of the Eleventh Circuit in Florida has long and storied 
past, spanning to the enactment of the 1972 Act. The battle over Florida’s 
conversion of its everglades to agricultural land has consumed generations. 
 
                                                 
203 Cannon, supra note 171, at 383 (“The community in interest consists of the people who bear 
the significant costs and benefits of addressing a watershed issue”).  
204 Although EPA did provide criteria guidance, few adopted even partial criteria. See EPA, 
EPA822-B-00-019 Ambient Water Quality Criteria Recommendations: Information Supporting 
the Development of State and Tribal Nutrient Criteria, Rivers and Streams in Nutrient Ecoregion 
IX, (Dec. 2000); see also Jonathan Cannon, Checking in on the Chesapeake: Some Questions of 
Design, 40 U. RICH. L. REV. 1131, 1144-45 (2006); see also Jody M. Endres, and Matthew A. 
Walker, A tale of three watersheds: U.S. EPA's contrasting approaches to agricultural nutrient 
pollution, 2 WIRES WATER 47 (2015). 
205 Cannon, supra note 171, at 400. (“Although the Chesapeake Bay Agreement does not provide a 
means for its enforcement, the norms of mutual dependence and cooperation that have been 
developed in the course of the program offer some protection against forms of strategic behavior 
such as free riding”); see also Shana Campbell Jones, Making Regional and Local TMDLS Work: 
The Chesapeake Bay TMDL and Lessons from the Lynnhaven River, 38 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. 
& POL'Y REV. 277, 293 (2014). 
206 See infra notes 90-103 on numeric standards. 
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1. The Consent Decree  
 
In 2008, environmental groups filed suit in the Northern District of 
Florida, asserting that vague policy statements made by the EPA in a 1998 
document, Clean Water Action Plan: Restoring and Protecting America’s 
Waters,207 constituted a “necessity determination” for numeric nutrient criteria for 
Florida’s waters, and failure to act was a violation of CWA §303(c)(4)(B).208 
Simultaneously, the Florida Department of Environmental Protection (FDEP) 
commenced development of its own numeric criteria, yet each plan met a similar 
fate of endless revisions and implementation extensions.209 Illustrating the force 
of the citizen suit nudge, in 2009 EPA exercised their statutory authority and 
issued an explicit necessity determination. 210  This time, EPA agreed with the 
observed error, and initiated its correction, which would begin the mapping 
process. 
Later that year, the environmental groups and EPA entered into a consent 
decree that required EPA to propose and finalize numeric nutrient criteria for the 
state of Florida, unless FDEP criteria was approved.211 Hanging over the heads of 
FDEP like a carrot was the threat of federal intervention, but it still continued to 
drag its feet. Shortly thereafter EPA delivered the stick, issuing its own numeric 
criteria for Florida.212  
Some of EPA’s numeric criteria fell short according to the court, 
                                                 
207 Florida Wildlife Fed'n, Inc. v. Jackson, 853 F. Supp. 2d 1138, 1146 (N.D. Fla. 2012).  
208 EPA, CLEAN WATER ACTION PLAN: RESTORING AND PROTECTING AMERICA'S WATERS 58–59 
(1998), available at 
http://yosemite.epa.gov/water/owrccatalog.nsf/e673c95b11602f2385256ae1007279fe/8cc8c2fd48
6f236a85256d83004fda6e!OpenDocument. The 1998 document said that the Administrator 
expected all states “to adopt and implement numerical nutrient criteria” by 2003. 
209 Florida Wildlife Fed'n, Inc. 853 F. Supp. 2d at 1147. 
210 Id. at 1150.  
211 Florida Wildlife Fed'n, Inc. v. Jackson, 4:08CV324-RHWCS, 2009 WL 5217062 (N.D. Fla. 
Dec. 30, 2009). 
212 Florida Wildlife Fed'n, Inc., 853 F. Supp. 2d at 1176-77. 
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particularly the stream criteria and the default downstream-protection criteria for 
unimpaired lakes were declared arbitrary and capricious because of the reference 
model EPA used to determine impairment. Any stream would automatically 
classify as being impaired if it exceeded the 90th percentile for nutrient levels of a 
geographic sample set.213 Downstream protection levels, set at the nexus where a 
stream enters a lake, would potentially classify an entire stream system as 
impaired if its nutrient levels were higher than the ambient conditions of the 
lake. 214  The court deemed these benchmarks arbitrary, as they were not an 
adequate indicator of a harmful increase in nutrient levels, but rather simply an 
increase in nutrient levels, which may be harmful or not.215 
Nudging FDEP to act, part of the EPA criteria was subsequently replaced 
with FDEP numeric standards per the terms of the consent agreement, as EPA had 
explicitly preserved its right to yield to FDEP standards conditional on federal 
approval.216 Not all of FDEP’s proposed standards followed EPA guidance, and 
the FDEP's proposal used narrative criteria for “South Florida streams and for 
marine lakes, tidally influenced streams, and conveyances primarily used for 
water-management purposes with marginal or poor stream habitat 
components.”217 With Florida now moving on its commitment, EPA amended its 
2009 determination to allow for some narrative criteria, and sought to modify the 
                                                 
213 Id. at 1168 (“Instead, a stream is deemed impaired—in four of the regions—if a nutrient level 
exceeds that of 90% of the sample set”.) 
214 Id. at 1170 (“By setting the default DPVs equal to ambient conditions at the pour point, the rule 
in effect disapproves any change in nutrients, even a change that will have no harmful effect. The 
result is that upon an increase in a nutrient level at the pour point, an entire stream system is 
deemed impaired, even if the increase is to a level well below the lake or stream criterion, and 
even if the change has no harmful effect on the lake's flora or fauna”). 
215 Id. at 1168 (“The use of unadjusted ambient conditions makes clear that at least for that 
purpose, the Administrator was shooting at a target intended to identify any change in nutrient 
levels, not just a harmful change”). 
216 Florida Wildlife Fed'n, Inc. v. McCarthy, No. 4:08CV324-RH/CAS, 2014 WL 51360, at *4 
(N.D. Fla. Jan. 7, 2014), aff'd sub nom. Florida Wildlife Fed'n Inc v. Adm'r, U.S. Envtl. Prot. 
Agency, 620 F. App'x 705 (11th Cir. 2015). 
217 Id. at 4. 
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consent decree with environmental groups due to the amendments and approval of 
the state numeric standards.218 Given that federal numeric standard promulgation 
would be rendered moot with the ratified state standards, the court granted the 
request, holding the EPA’s revisions consistent with the Act and implementing 
the EPA-approved state standards.219  
 
2. Uncooperative Federalism: Costs of State Primacy 
 
The convoluted situation in Florida highlights a series of nudges and the 
underlying priorities. First, people tend to be extremely loss adverse, often to their 
detriment.220 Loss aversion pressures us not to make changes even when those 
changes might be in our best interest for fear of losing our current position. In 
Florida, EPA was willing to yield to the power to the state to promulgate 
standards. For a resource constrained agency, EPA has little hesitation to hand the 
reins over to the states, as is also statutorily required, when the states uphold their 
responsibility over standard setting for impaired waters. Florida very well could 
have retained control of numeric development from the outset and avoided the 
nudge had it preemptively accepted EPA’s offer to transform its narrative criteria 
into numerical values. Whether this would translate into greater flexibility in 
EPA’s decision to approve a state’s numeric standards is debatable, however here 
Florida did revive narrative standards for certain waters where EPA had 
previously certified numeric values. Fortunately for both EPA and FDEP, EPA 
was able to modify the consent decree despite protest from environmental groups, 
and authorize the Florida standards.  
                                                 
218 Id.  
219 Id. 
220 NUDGE, supra note 2, at 34. (“Loss aversion operates as a cognitive nudge, pressing us not to 
make changes, even when changes are very much in our interests”).  
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Second, the case casts skepticism on whether the necessity determination 
is the most suitable vehicle to structure these complex choices and map narrative 
standards into quantitative numeric standards because of the priority to return to 
cooperative federalism. 221  Undoubtedly, the environmental group’s necessity 
determination nudged the transformation of narrative to numeric criteria, and that 
benefit cannot be overlooked. Yet the ultimate consequence from the final consent 
decree was exemption of flowing waters in the South Florida Region, marine 
lakes, tidally-influenced flowing waters, and conveyances primarily used for 
water management purposes with marginal or poor stream habitat components.222 
The court’s logic was the EPA failed to properly “translate Florida's existing 
narrative nutrient criterion into numeric criteria.”223 In fact, intervening industry 
groups on behalf of the EPA asserted not that numeric standards were 
unnecessary, but that appropriate numeric standards cannot be put in place as 
quickly as the consent decree would require.224 
On its face, this may seem like a loss for water quality advocates, but 
states are considered to be the foremost authority on regulation of their waters. 
Over the last decade, Courts have been generally tightening federal commerce 
clause jurisdiction, but also specifically under the Clean Water Act.225 Beyond the 
constitutional arguments, there is scientific logic behind the transition as well. 
Statewide water quality standards such as those initially proposed by EPA may 
frustrate protection of certain water bodies by listing waters with naturally high 
                                                 
221 See also Kerr, supra note 193, at 1222. 
222 Water Quality Standards for the State of Florida's Lakes and Flowing Waters; Withdrawal, 79 
Fed. Reg. 18494-01 (2012). 
223 Florida Wildlife Fed'n, Inc. 853 F. Supp. 2d at 1160. 
224 Florida Wildlife Fed'n, Inc. 2009 WL 5217062, at *5. 
225 United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (held that Gun-Free School Zones Act, making it 
federal offense for any individual knowingly to possess firearm at place that individual knows or 
has reasonable cause to believe is school zone, exceeded Congress' commerce clause authority, 
since possession of gun in local school zone was not economic activity that substantially affected 
interstate commerce). For cases specific to the CWA jurisdiction, see infra notes 34 and 160. 
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nutrient levels as impaired, and ignoring those that are actually impaired despite 
meeting numeric criteria. 226  Nonetheless, nudging played a significant yet 
inefficient role by coaxing Florida to draft numeric standards.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
226 Florida Wildlife Fed'n, Inc. 2014 WL 51360, at *8 
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PART IV: INCENTIVIZING STATE MANAGEMENT PLANS 
 
This part addresses the federal and state nutrient management plans that 
have been the cornerstone of the voluntary efforts. In particular, I highlight the 
Midwestern states of Iowa, Illinois, and Minnesota given their status as 
agricultural powerhouses in the Mississippi River Basin, but also to demonstrate 
their disparate vigor to compel voluntary reductions. Courts remain a powerful 
and influential player in nudging nutrient pollution accountability, but they move 
at a pace fixed to the procedural process. Individual states across the country are 
taking steps to devise comprehensive and collaborative nutrient management 
programs, vowing to preempt potential lawsuits.  
In theory, the plans embody the quintessential nudge within choice 
architecture; they preserve the liberty of choosing reduction methods while 
changing the behavior for the greater good. Association is likely owed to common 
underlying principles between nudging and the theory of adaptive management, 
the robust decision-making process prevalent to natural resource management.227 
The similar doctrines of thought rely on a determination of goals and objectives, 
development of conceptual models, and feedback to make improvements while 
simultaneously diminishing uncertainty in future decisions. 228  Throughout the 
paper thus far, we have identified principles implicit to effective choice 
architecture: understanding mapping, the power of defaults, giving feedback, 
expecting error, and structuring complex choices.229 Here, we will explore the 
final prong of choice architecture, incentives, through the lens of nutrient 
reduction strategies.  
                                                 
227 See Robin Kundis Craig & J.B. Ruhl, Designing Administrative Law for Adaptive 
Management, 67 VAND. L. REV. 1, 7-8 (2014). 
228 Id.; Carl Walters, Challenges in Adaptive management of Riparian and Coastal Ecosystems 1.2 
CONSERVATION ECOLOGY 1 (1997). 
229 NUDGE, supra note 2, at 102. 
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In general, the nutrient reduction strategies ultimately acknowledge the 
path to numeric criteria, but rely on “best management practices” (BMPs) funded 
under section 319 of the Act, a cost-sharing grant program.230  The section 319 
Nonpoint Source Management Program does not confer authority to states to 
penalize nonpoint source polluters who fail to apply best management practices or 
give the federal government authority to intervene with their own plan, but rather 
it provides financial to encourage the adoption of such practices.231   All the 
section requires management plans include are a description of BMPs and 
implementation strategy, a timeline of proposed annual milestones, and state 
matching sources of funding.232  
Financial incentives are a necessary cog of the choice architecture 
machine and an influential form of nudging, but architects must be cognizant of 
who uses, who chooses, who pays, and who profits.233 Outside investment by 
nonfarmers in agricultural land further complicates implementation of voluntary 
measures because lease arrangement creates little incentive to invest in land 
sustainability.234 Roots run deep in the agricultural communities, and these plans 
                                                 
23033 U.S.C. § 1329; see also USDA, REGIONAL CONSERVATION PARTNERSHIP PROGRAM, 
available at http://www.nrcs.usda.gov/wps/portal/nrcs/main/national/programs/farmbill/rcpp/; 
Williams, supra note 20, at 69 (“Another similar program was the section 208 program, however 
Congress ceased funding the ineffective grants program in 1981 because of structural 
shortcomings”).  
231 Williams, supra note 22, at 75. 
232 33 USC 1329(b)(2); 40 C.F.R. § 35.268 The only real limitation on funding is the requirement 
that states demonstrate they have made progress on reducing pollutant loadings.  
233 NUDGE, supra note 2, at 99; HTF 2015 REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 69 at 66. Between 
2009-2013, EPA invested $2.3 billion dollars through grant funding to HTF states, with an 
additional $5 billion coming from NRCS investments in voluntary conservation programs in HTF 
states.  
234 As federal farm programs continue to encourage investment in farmland by non-farmers 
because they hold up return of investment even in the face of declining crop prices, nudging in the 
form of sustainable farm leases may nudge soil conservation. See EDWARD COX, THE 
LANDOWNER'S GUIDE TO SUSTAINABLE FARM LEASING (2010); John H. Davidson, Factory Fields: 
Agricultural Practices, Polluted Water and Hypoxic Oceans, 9 GREAT PLAINS NAT. RESOURCES J. 
1, 28-29 (2004); see also  
https://www.iowafarmbureau.com/Article/Farm-and-city-partnerships-can-solve-water-quality-
challenges (last accessed March 30, 2016). 
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strike a workable balance, but success will rely entirely on the commitment to the 
deadlines and goals.235  
 
a. Mississippi River/Gulf of Mexico Watershed Nutrient Task Force 
 
Of the 31 states that drain into the Mississippi River basin, nine Midwest 
states contribute approximately 75% of the nutrients entering the Gulf. 236  In 
response to the 1.57 million tons of nitrogen transported to the Gulf of Mexico via 
the Mississippi River, EPA partnered with five federal agencies and twelve state 
representatives of agriculture and environmental agencies to form the Gulf 
Hypoxia Task Force (HTF).237  Coinciding with the enactment of the Harmful 
Algal Bloom and Hypoxia Research and Control Act (HABHRCA), the Task 
Force was chartered in May 1998 with the directive to “provide executive level 
direction and support for coordinating the actions of participating organizations 
working on nutrient management within the Mississippi River/Gulf of Mexico 
Watershed.”238 Clearly this would be a colossal undertaking, and thus Congress 
appropriated one billion dollars annually, however the proposed funding was 
                                                 
235 A. Bryan Endres  & Lisa R. Schlessinger, Legal Solutions to Wicked Problems in Agriculture: 
Public-Private Cooperative Weed Management Structures as a Sustainable Approach to 
Herbicide Resistance (2015) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with authors). 
236 Illinois, Iowa, Indiana, Missouri, Arkansas, Kentucky, Tennessee, Ohio, and Mississippi. R.B 
Alexander., R.A. Smith, G.E. Schwarz, E.W. Boyer, J.V. Nolan, and J.W. Brakebill. Differences 
in Phosphorus and Nitrogen Delivery to the Gulf of Mexico from the Mississippi River Basin. 42 
ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY 822-830 (2008); Pamela A. Porter, Robert B. 
Mitchell, and Kenneth J. Moore. Reducing hypoxia in the Gulf of Mexico: Reimagining a more 
Resilient Agricultural Landscape in the Mississippi River Watershed. 70.3 JOURNAL OF SOIL AND 
WATER CONSERVATION 63A-68A (2015). 
237 Mississippi River/Gulf of Mexico Watershed Nutrient Task Force, 
http://water.epa.gov/type/watersheds/named/msbasin/index.cfm (last visited March 20, 2016). 
238 Agreement to Shrink the Dead Zone. Charter of the Mississippi River/Gulf of Mexico 
Watershed Nutrient Task Force (May 1998). available at https://www.epa.gov/ms-htf/charter-
mississippi-rivergulf-mexico-watershed-nutrient-task-force; Title VI, Pub. L. No. 105-383, §§ 
601-606, 112 Stat. 3447, 3447-50 (Nov. 13, 1998). 
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eliminated in the wake of economic recession and the War on Terror.239  
Instead, the HTF acts almost as an intermediary, funneling other sources 
of funding to HTF states. For example, from 2009 to 2013, the Natural Resource 
Conservation Service (NRCS) invested nearly $5 billion in voluntary 
conservation programs in HTF states.240 Although there was never an explicit 
threat of withholding funding for failure to join HTF, the program heavily invests 
in the member states. Additionally, composition of the Task Force is distinct from 
the Chesapeake Bay Program in that its participants retain much more individual 
autonomy than members of the Chesapeake Bay Program, there is less of an 
external accountable structure.241 The original deadline to reduce nitrogen and 
phosphorus delivery to the Gulf by 45 percent resulting in a hypoxic zone less 
than 5,000 km2 was 2015, although given the lack of progress the deadline was 
recently extended to 2035.242  
In 2008, the HTF released the Gulf Hypoxia Action Plan that describes a 
national strategy for abating hypoxia in the Gulf of Mexico and improving water 
quality in the Mississippi River Basin, reaffirming the original goals by Hypoxia 
Task Force in 2001. 243  More importantly, it directed states to “complete and 
implement comprehensive nitrogen and phosphorus reduction strategies.” 244 
According to HTF, these comprehensive strategies were to be developed in the 
context of six core guiding principles: encourage actions that are voluntary, 
incentive-based, practical, and cost-effective; utilize existing programs, including 
                                                 
239 Donnelle Eller, States want 20 more years to meet Gulf dead-zone goals, DES MOINES 
REGISTER, February 12, 2015, available at 
http://www.desmoinesregister.com/story/money/agriculture/2015/02/12/states-contributing-gulf-
dead-zone-push-deadline/23322609/. 
240 HTF REPORT TO CONGRESS 2015, supra note 69, at 64. 
241 MASSIVE PROBLEMS, supra note 18, at 109.  
242 See EPA, GULF HYPOXIA ACTION PLAN 2008 (2008), available at http://water.epa.gov 
/type/watersheds/named/msbasin/upload/2008_8_28_msbasin_ghap2008_update082608.pdf. 
243 Id.  
244 Id. at 32. 
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existing state and federal regulatory mechanisms; follow adaptive management; 
identify additional funding needs and sources during the annual agency budget 
processes; identify opportunities for, and potential barriers to, innovative and 
market-based solutions; and provide measurable outcomes as outlined in the 
plan.245 As a result, the Task Force’s most redeeming feature is the collaborative 
network to assist states in developing their own nutrient reduction strategies. 246 
Nonetheless, the state Nutrient Reduction Strategies (NRS) would likely have 
benefited from more explicit guidance on the components of the nutrient plans. 
Thus nudging could have had the advantage of ensuring the state NRS all meet 
minimum specifications, which is discussed in greater detail below. 
Based on the principles of successful choice architecture, the Gulf 
Watershed Task Force model is a convincing example of nudging. This approach 
preserves the state’s flexibility of choice in meeting their reduction allocations, 
while concurrently seeking to fund tangible conservation measures and provide 
data that would be otherwise unattainable.247 The risk exists, however, that while 
the partnership may provide of examples of “success,” such as active research, 
agreements, reports, and voluntary programs, little actual environmental 
achievement may occur.248 This counteracts the main theme elicited through this 
section, incentives, because it simply encourages the status quo, exemplified by 
the decision to postpone the reduction deadline.  
                                                 
245 Id. at 8. 
246 Pamela A. Porter, Robert B. Mitchell, and Kenneth J. Moore. Reducing Hypoxia in the Gulf of 
Mexico: Reimagining a more Resilient Agricultural Landscape in the Mississippi River 
Watershed, 70.3 JOURNAL OF SOIL AND WATER CONSERVATION 63A-68A (2015) (“A weakness of 
the 2008 action plan is that it contains nothing to suggest that actions discussed in the plan will in 
fact achieve the goals...The current framework of mainly voluntary coordination of actions and 
programs, although useful for promoting dialogue and raising awareness of water quality issues, 
has not realized substantive accomplishments in terms of on-the- ground project implementation 
or documented improvements in water quality”). 
247 MASSIVE PROBLEMS, supra note 18, at 109. 
248 Cannon, supra note 205, at 1136 (citing Howard R. Ernst, Chesapeake Bay Blues: Science, 
Politics, and the Struggle to Save the Bay (2003)). 
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Incentives exist through funding of programs such as the Environmental 
Quality Incentives Program (EQIP), which provides technical, financial, and 
educational assistance to farmers to implement BMP adoption, the Conservation 
Reserve Program (CRP), which pays farmers to set aside sensitive farmlands for 
ten to fifteen years; and the Conservation Reserve Enhancement Program 
(CREP), which funds long-term conservation easements and encourages farmers 
to adopt conservation practices. 249  Yet incentives need to be in place for 
reductions or actions that go beyond the conventional practices and motivate 
states to be the frontrunner in some aspect of water quality.250  Water quality 
trading programs are one solution because entities can capitalize on excesses, but 
the physical structure for that scheme is not in place.251 With the looming threat of 
watershed TMDL building, possibly a non-monetary “get-out-of jail-free-card” 
type incentive might be feasible for states willing to enact numeric standards.252  
 
b. Strong Choice Architecture in State Nutrient Reduction Plans 
 
Beyond the mutual goal to reduce nutrient loads by 45%, Nutrient 
Reduction Strategies in the Midwest tend to share similar characteristics in that 
they describe a comprehensive suite of best management practices for reducing 
loads from wastewater treatment plants and urban and agriculture runoff.253 Based 
on the core principles of strong choice architecture, the plans should resonate with 
all stakeholders. A few crucial characteristics of each plan, however, distinguish 
                                                 
249 See Sherry A. Enzler, EPA-Minnesota Ag Certainty Program-Is It Up to the Task of Cleaning 
Our Waters?, 39 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 959, 976 (2013). 
250 Williams, supra note 22, at 109-10. 
251 Id.  
252 A similar approach has been incorporated in Minnesota, see Enzler, supra note 250. 
253 ILLINOIS STATEWIDE NUTRIENT LOSS REDUCTION STRATEGY (2014) available at 
http://www.epa.state.il.us/water/nutrient/ [hereinafter Illinois Nutrient Reduction Strategy]. 
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whether the plans are received with support or litigation.254  
First, a state’s decision to adopt numeric water quality criteria is 
preeminent feature that coincides with NRS development. The Iowa Nutrient 
Reduction Strategy answers the call of the 2008 Gulf Hypoxia Acton Plan, 
however embraced the ideology of the Stoner Memo, and the drafters ultimately 
chose not implement any numeric standards because of a lack of confidence in 
EPA’s criteria recommendations, technological infeasibility, and the substantial 
financial costs associated with implementing nutrient removal technologies.255 
Conversely, Minnesota does have numeric standards for phosphates in lakes and 
reservoirs throughout the state, and intends to implement numeric standards for 
nitrates and rivers in the future.256 The Illinois nutrient management plan contains 
numeric standards for phosphates in lakes and nitrate level in streams designated 
as public water supplies. 257  Notably, however, numeric standards are absent 
where they are needed the most, in Illinois’ expansive stream system.258 Seeking 
to avoid the perceived first step to increased regulation, states are then hesitant to 
accurately develop TMDLs for impaired water bodies within its borders.259 
Second, states must continue to allocate funds and contribute financial 
support. As noted above, federal funds are distributed under 319 to maximum of 
                                                 
254 See Drew L. Kershen, Sustainable Intensive Agriculture: High Technology and Environmental 
Benefits, KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y, 424, 449 (2007). 
255 See IOWA NUTRIENT REDUCTION STRATEGY, supra note 173, at 7; Houck, supra note 38, at 
10434 (“Iowa, ranking number two for nitrogen and four for phosphorus, has no work plan to 
develop them for any class of waters, and has recently determined that numeric criteria are not 
necessary at this time even for the protection of recreational swimming.”) 
256 MINNESOTA NUTRIENT REDUCTION STRATEGY (2014) available at 
https://www.pca.state.mn.us/water/nutrient-reduction-strategy [hereinafter MINNESOTA NUTRIENT 
REDUCTION STRATEGY]; Enzler, supra note 250, at 960. 
257 ILLINOIS NUTRIENT REDUCTION STRATEGY, supra note 254, at. Total Phosphorus: 0.05 mg/L. 
Lakes only to protect Aquatic Life Use and Aesthetic Quality Use.   Nitrate: 10 mg/L. Stream 
segments and Lakes designated as Public Water Supplies. A narrative WQS prohibiting excess 
algae or plant growth exists for all waters.    
258 Houck, supra note 38, at 10434 Illinois has not yet developed even a work plan for nutrient 
criteria for streams, which are of course where nitrogen and phosphorous start their journeys 
downstream; indeed, the state no longer identifies phosphorus as a cause of impairment at all. 
259 See infra notes 90-102 on impediments to numeric standard development.   
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60 percent of the approved work plan.260 The Illinois Fertilizer Act ensures that a 
$0.75/ton assessment on all bulk fertilizer sold in Illinois is allocated to research 
and educational programs focused on nutrient use and water quality. 261 
Additionally, Minnesota amended its constitution in 2009 to incorporate the 
Minnesota Clean Water, Land and Legacy Amendment, which allocates 33 
percent of the sales tax revenue from the Legacy amendment to protect, enhance, 
and restore water quality in lakes, rivers, and streams and to protect groundwater 
from degradation.262 When initially completed in 2013, the Iowa Department of 
Agriculture and Land Stewardship (IDALS) received $22.4 million to implement 
the conservation measures for nonpoint sources.263 However, funding to support 
Iowa’s NRS was slashed in 2014.264  Currently, Iowa’s plan for funding is to 
“make most effective use of funding resources including maximizing benefits per 
amount expended.”265 
Third, a timeline is critical. Illinois expects its nonpoint source practices 
will help the state reduce its phosphorus load by 25 percent and its nitrate‐
nitrogen load by 15 percent by 2025.266 At the headwaters of the Mississippi 
River, Minnesota plans to take its fair share of the nutrient pollution burden and 
achieve a 45% reduction of nitrogen and phosphorus in the Mississippi River by 
2045.267 While the Iowa strategy was one of the few to meet the initial deadline 
by the Task Force requiring state nutrient plans, it lacks any timeline for 
implementation. This omission may prove to be a fatal flaw. As mentioned above, 
                                                 
260 40 C.F.R. § 35.265 
261 ILLINOIS NUTRIENT REDUCTION STRATEGY, supra note 254, at 6-8; Illinois Fertilizer Act 505 
ILCS 80 (2012). 
262 See Minnesota’s Legacy available at http://www.legacy.leg.mn/about-funds. 
263 HTF 2015 REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 69, at 39.  
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Lawsuit, 2015 Iowa Water Conference (2015). 
265 IOWA NUTRIENT REDUCTION STRATEGY, supra note 173, at 4. 
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the success of voluntary nutrient management plans relies wholly on the 
willingness to implement, and there is minimal incentive to implement without a 
deadline. Here, we return our discussion to litigation as a cautionary tale where 
the Iowa NRS has failed to nudge with sufficient force. Iowa county leaders will 
be standing behind the state-sponsored nutrient pollution plan that is less than two 
years old and still in infancy.268  
 
c. Des Moines Water Works Law Suit: Outcome of a Weak Nudge 
 
Competing with an expanding population, the conflict brewing in the one 
of the Mississippi River Basin’s agricultural powerhouse states has put the 
nonpoint source community on notice.269 To put the physical and social landscape 
in perspective, roughly one in five Iowans are employed by agriculture. 270 
Plaintiff Des Moines Water Works (DMWW) is a regional water treatment utility 
located in Iowa that draws direct from the local Raccoon and Des Moines Rivers 
to provide some half a million citizens clean drinking water.271 Suffering from 
increasingly prohibitive costs incurred from nitrate and phosphorus removal, 
                                                 
268 Brett Walton, Des Moines Initiates Clean Water Act Lawsuit to Stem Farm Pollution, available 
at http://www.circleofblue.org/waternews/2015/world/des-moines-initiates-clean-water-act-
lawsuit-to-stem-farm-pollution/; see also Annie Snider, Water Pollution: Iowa utility’s lawsuit 
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269 See Jonathan Coppess. Thinking about the Des Moines Water Works Lawsuit and the History of 
Drainage. Policy Matters, POLICY MATTERS (2015) available at 
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accessed March 25, 2016). 
271 Complaint, Board of Water Works, et al. v. Sac County Board of Supervisors, No. 5: 15-cv-
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DMWW now seeks to hold three rural Iowa’s drainage districts accountable as 
point sources under the Act and recover costs through common law claims.272  
Attacking the characterization of tile drainage infrastructure as a point 
source is not an entirely new concept; conservation groups in California 
challenged it without success as recently in 2013.273 DMWW is taking a slightly 
different approach in their recent complaint, contesting it is the drainage district’s 
failure as a whole to receive a NPDES permit that has resulted in excess nutrients. 
274  DMWW contends the runoff does not fall under the exemption for 
“agricultural stormwater discharge” or “return flows from irrigated agriculture,” 
but rather is classified as “artificially drained groundwater” and therefore should 
not be exempt from permitting.275 To meet its consumption regulation, DMWW 
seeks a 45 percent nitrate reduction, which is in line with federal and state 
reduction goals.276  
Until now, nonpoint source lawsuits over absent water quality standards 
have only indirectly affected agricultural interests. Litigation deep in Iowa’s 
productive farmland directly confronts the agricultural community and exposes a 
much larger clash of ideological interests.  No regulations exist for issuing 
NPDES permits to drainage districts, and means to achieve the necessary 
reductions could create cumbersome regulation.277 As a result of the suit, other 
drainage districts throughout the Midwest are taking heed and seeking preliminary 
                                                 
272 The Des Moines suit is composed of two separate trials. Constitutional issues relating to the 
power of drainage districts will be decided in the Iowa Supreme Court, while the Clean Water Act 
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counsel. 278  As previously mentioned, states and nonpoint source contributors 
currently have the benefit of a cooperative approach to water quality. Des Moines 
is an example of potential alternative arrangements as the result of a weak or 
absent nudge.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
278 Phyllis Coulter, Illinois drainage group sets up legal defense fund, eyes Iowa suit, ILLINOIS 
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CONCLUSION 
 
The cooperative federalism structure as originally designed did not have 
the capacity to deal with the massive problem of hypoxia we face today. To 
adequately evolve, the framework needs to expand the traditional roles of all 
stakeholders under the Act. The best policy instrument to do this is nudging 
because it alleviates constitutional concerns by potential regulatees while 
promoting water quality improvement.  
Thus a possible answer to the massive nonpoint source problem requires 
all stakeholders to embrace the ongoing transforming process by utilizing nudges 
available in choice architecture. By now, it should be evident that despite 
Congress being the ultimate choice architect of the Clean Water Act, they are not 
the only sovereign or entity that has the power to design their own architecture 
and nudge the subject through its structure. Strategic nudging at different levels 
within the framework of the Act will likely lead to development, adoption and 
implementation of effective control policies. Many other areas across the country 
are rife with eutrophic waters, such as the Great Lakes, and would benefit from a 
nudge. Additional forms of nudging will need to be identified to further this goal, 
before Congress decides to remove the exemptions for agriculture all together, or 
find a way to hold agricultural representatives accountable for regulation as point 
sources as in the Des Moines Water Works lawsuit.  
 
